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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 The healthcare system of the United States of America has been in a contentious 
position for decades. It has been the center of numerous political, ethical, and legal 
battles.1 The enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“the Act”) on 
March 23, 2010 represents the most recent development in this ongoing struggle to 
balance opposing viewpoints on the best role the federal government should play in the 
healthcare market. The Act has already had and will continue to have enormous effects 
on this country’s healthcare system and the policies through which it interacts with 
individual American citizens. However, the Act will have implications reaching far 
beyond the healthcare sector.  
Due to the legal challenges initiated by those who oppose various provisions of 
this new legislation, the Supreme Court will not only have the final say on which aspects 
of the Act are constitutional and thus remain in effect, but it will also have the task of 
defining limits to the Congress’ power under the commerce clause in an area where the 
Court has never before set foot. The Court bundled the majority of these challenges into 
Department of Health and Human Services v. Florida, and one of the most significant 
questions being raised is whether or not individual mandate provision of the Act is a valid 
exercise of the Congress’ commerce power. Its forthcoming decision has the potential to 
                                                
1 Atlas, Scott W. Reforming America’s Health Care System: The Flawed Vision of 
ObamaCare (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 2010), 83. 
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either grant unprecedentedly unchecked powers or begin the return to a Congress with a 
limited and specifically enumerated commerce power. 
 In the past, the Court has not been shy about showing great deference to the 
Congress’ commerce power. Two periods in history represent the greatest expansions of 
the interpretation of the commerce clause. In 1824, the Marshall Court heard the first 
challenge to an act passed by the Congress under the auspices of authorization from the 
commerce clause in Gibbons v. Ogden. In this case, Chief Justice Marshall interpreted the 
commerce clause to the advantage of the Congress. Marshall allowed for the broad use of 
the words “commerce” and “among.” Combining these new definitions with his plenary 
view of the commerce power as “complete in itself” and acknowledging “no limitations 
other than are prescribed in the constitution,” Marshall set the precedent for an expansive 
interpretation of the commerce clause.2 For over a hundred years following the Court’s 
Gibbons decision, subsequent Courts have implemented unique tests and theories to limit 
the applicability of Marshall’s precedent and prevent additional growth. 
 Another cycle of expansion of the commerce power started in 1936 with President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal legislation. The Court initially rejected the vast 
majority of FDR’s programs that he thought would help the American people following 
the Great Depression, in keeping with the Court’s contractionary response to Gibbons.  
However, following FDR’s attempted court-packing plan, the Court abruptly changed its 
tune. Beginning with West Hotel Company v. Parrish and National Labor Relations 
Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Company in 1936, the Court started to uphold 
congressional actions under the commerce power that were more egregious than those it 
                                                
2 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 17 (1824). 
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had overturned less than a year earlier. This newly advanced view of the commerce 
power continued for nearly sixty years during which time there was not a single 
significant judicial check on the Congress’ regulatory authority under the commerce 
clause. The response to this second expansion only began with the Rehnquist Court’s 
United States v. Lopez decision in 1995. The line in the sand that the Court drew in Lopez 
has been faithfully maintained since then, although the Court has made no effort to 
overturn the expansive precedent set throughout the first half of this cycle. 
 The Court is faced with a decision in HHS v. Florida that will have monumental 
effects on future jurisprudence regarding the commerce clause. If it rules that the 
individual mandate is an overreach on the behalf of the Congress and that the commerce 
clause does not authorize the Congress to require individuals to purchase health 
insurance, it will represent a continuation of the limiting approach it has taken since 1995 
that was established in Lopez, reinforced in U.S. v. Morrison (2000), and supported – 
when looked at through a historical perspective – even by Gonzales v. Raich (2005). 
However, if it gives the nod to the constitutionality of the mandate, it will represent the 
first such expansion of the commerce power in over a decade. Furthermore, it would 
mark the beginning of an entirely new cycle of Court decisions. The Court would spend 
the next several decades delineating the boundaries to which this new interpretation of 
the commerce clause is subject. In essence, the Court can either remain in the 
contractionary portion of the second cycle of commerce clause jurisprudence, or it can 
initiate the third cycle by expanding the meaning of the commerce clause well beyond its 
original intentions. 
 4 
  The briefs filed in this case contain clear signals to individual justices attempting 
to sway them one way or another. The three most clearly targeted are Justice Scalia, 
Justice Kennedy, and Chief Justice Roberts. The four “liberal” justices are considered to 
surely vote in support of the individual mandate, and the remaining two “conservative” 
justices are those least likely to break ranks and be the one vote that the government 
needs to make its case. An article on Politico.com coyly claims that the Court’s decision 
on this issue “could hinge on wheat, pot and broccoli,” and this quip is not too far from 
the truth.3 Two major Court precedents about the commerce clause involve the growth of 
wheat and the possession of marijuana (pot). The Act’s opponents frequently cite the 
argument that if the Congress can make people buy healthcare, it could make them enter 
into almost any commercial action, including buying broccoli. 
 While both parties crafted their arguments to win over these three key jurists, only 
one of the parties appears to be successful. Based on the relative weaknesses in the briefs, 
there were several main issues that each side had to address during oral arguments. 
Unfortunately for the Obama Administration, the respondents were more persuasive in 
convincing these three key players.  The Court will likely vote 5-4 to overturn the 
minimum coverage provision of the Act. Although the decision will be along ideological 
lines, each of the three justices whose vote has been identified as potentially up for grabs 
will weigh arguments specific to their own constitutional beliefs. The Court will 
determine that the petitioners have failed to make their case that the commerce clause 
authorizes the Congress to require individuals to purchase healthcare insurance. In doing 
                                                
3 Gerstein, Josh. “Health law could hinge on wheat, pot and broccoli.” Politico. Accessed 
22 March 2012. http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0312/74324.html.  
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so, the Court will maintain the line in the sand that it drew over a decade ago and prevent 
another cycle of expansion for the Congress’ commerce power. 
  
 6 
Chapter 2: Overview of the Act 
  
I. Political History 
 
When Barack Obama was sworn in as the 44th President of the United States, he 
made it clear that healthcare was going to be one of his priorities. During his inaugural 
address, Obama twice mentioned problems with the health care system’s excessive costs 
and inability to provide high quality, technological-advanced healthcare to everyone.1 
Less than a year and a half later, on March 23, 2010, President Obama signed the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA, “the Act”) into law. PPACA has become 
one of the biggest domestic issues for contention between Democrats and Republicans. 
During the election cycle, throughout congressional debates, and even after it became 
law, the Act has drawn sharp criticism from opponents and laurels from its supporters. 
 Obama’s pressure for health care reform was one of his major campaign 
promises. Early in his campaign for the presidency, Obama pushed universal healthcare 
reform as one of the cornerstones for his potential administration. In January 2007, he 
said, “the time has come for universal health care in America.” He was determined that 
by the end of his first term, this country would have universal health care.2 Obama 
campaigned on the promise that his plan would ensure that all Americans would have 
                                                
1 “Barack Obama’s Inaugural Address,” New York Times. January 20, 2010. Accessed on 
13 March 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/20/us/politics/20text-
obama.html?pagewanted=all. 
2 Pickler, Nedra “Obama Calls for Healthcare Reform” USA Today. January 25, 2007. 
Accessed on March 6, 2012. http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2007-01-25-
obama-health_x.htm. 
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health care coverage through employers, private health plans, the federal government, or 
the individual states.3 
 These healthcare promises did not necessarily differentiate him from the rest of 
the Democratic field of contenders. In August 2008, the Democratic Party’s national 
platform called for the provision of access to affordable healthcare for every American 
citizen and pushed to make it a national priority. Hilary Clinton, Obama’s primary rival 
in the Democratic primaries, was the first of the candidates to push for a health insurance 
mandate that would require everyone to carry health insurance.4 In fact, all of the major 
Democratic candidates for nominee for president in 2008 supported some form of major 
health care reform on the federal level that purported to provide higher quality healthcare 
to more Americans. 
It was not just the party elite who was in favor of substantial health care reform to 
expand access to millions of Americans, but rather it was the Democratic base across the 
country that strongly supported such a reform. A poll released in February 2008 by the 
Harvard School of Public Health revealed that 71% of voting Democrats believed that a 
socialized medical system was in the country’s best interest and was preferable to the 
system that was in place at the time.5 Polls in 2008 indicated that health care reform was 
either the third or fourth most important issue to voters in determining the next president. 
                                                
3 “Barack Obama’s Campaign Positions” Washington Post. Accessed on March 6, 2012. 
washingtonpost.com/2008-presidential-candidates/issues/candidates/Obama. 
4 “Democratic Platform on Healthcare” New York Daily News. Accessed on March 6, 
2012. http://www.nydailynews.com/2008-08-21/news/17904315_1_democratic-party-
platform-health-care. 
5 “Poll Finds Americans Split by Political Party Over Whether Socialized Medicine 
Better or Worse Than Current System” February 14, 2008. Accessed on March 6, 2012. 
http://www.hsph .harvard.edu/news/press-releases/2008-releases/poll-americans. 
 8 
Healthcare was surpassed only by the economy following the 2008 economic crisis, the 
Iraq War, and possibly the price of gasoline – although many fold this into the underlying 
condition of the economy.6 
Discontent with Republican Party and President Bush’s handling of the economy 
and Iraq War led to a staggering democratic victory in the 2008 federal elections. In 
addition to winning the Presidency, the Democratic Party also increased their stronghold 
on both the House of Representatives and the Senate. While the Republicans were only 
the minority in the Senate prior to 2008 because the two Independents joined the 
Democrats, Republicans failed to pick up a single Democratic seat and lost eight of their 
own, giving the Democrats a 59-41 majority – inclusive of the two independents who 
caucused with the Democratic majority. The House saw a less drastic increase in 
Democratic power as they picked up 21 formerly Republican districts to give themselves 
a 257-178 majority over John Boehner’s Republican minority. With near filibuster-proof 
levels of control of the Congress, President Obama and his Democratic Party were poised 
to follow-up on the promises they made to gain this control. 
With the structural advantages of controlling two branches of the federal 
government, a health care reform pursuant to their desires was entirely possible.7 March 
2010 represented a close to over a year of active political debate over health reform. 
However, even with such strong institutional factors on their side, the Democrats were 
unable to push the legislation through without it being bogged down by Republicans who 
attempted to neuter it at every turn. On nearly every vote of significance, all Republicans 
                                                
6 “March Health Care Tracking Poll” Kaiser Family Foundation, 2010.  
7 Rigby, Elizabeth, Jennifer Hayes Clark, and Stacey Pelika. 2011. "Party Politics & 
Enactment of 'ObamaCare': Another Look at Minority Party Influence." 
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lined up to oppose the motion while nearly every Democrat voted in support.8 As a result, 
the Senate Majority Leader, Harry Reid, had to ensure the support of all 58 of his 
Democrats and both Independents to pass any legislation and break the quasi-filibuster 
informally attached to every motion by the Republican opposition. Republicans used 
various other procedural quirks to stall the bill’s passing.9 
Ostensibly, Republicans were not attempting to defeat the bill or delay its 
implementation out of spite. Instead, their actions were rooted in their conservative 
political ideals that value a laissez-faire market and a small federal government. To them, 
PPACA represented an encroachment of states’ rights and a violation of the basic free 
market economy that has made America prosper. Republicans support an approach that 
empowers individuals to make the choices necessary to have access to the highest quality 
healthcare, but without such high governmental intervention. They further object to 
requiring individuals to purchase health insurance if they do not feel that the costs justify 
such a purchase. As a result, Republicans range in their opposition of the Act from 
simply disliking several of the more intrusive provisions to finding the whole notion of a 
federal regulation of the healthcare market “un-American.”  
President Obama and the Democratic Party are motivated by ideals of social 
justice and equity. They view access to quality healthcare as a fundamental right on par 
with “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” In 2009, a large portion of the American 
population was uninsured and this left over 50 million American citizens without access 
                                                
8 Jacobs, Lawrence R. 2010. “What Health Reform Teaches us About American Politics.” 
PS: Political Science & Politics, 43(4):619-623. 
9 Jacobs, Lawrence R., and Theda Skocpol. Health Care Reform and American Politics: 
What Everyone Needs to Know. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
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to the high quality healthcare – the same healthcare services that the majority of 
Americans take for granted and rely on without a second thought. Healthcare spending 
represents roughly 16% of the United States’ GDP, and its portion is only expected to 
increase as time goes on.10 In 2000, it only represented 13% of GDP. This nearly 25% 
increase in spending over a decade is largely attributable to the rapid increase in prices as 
a result of technological innovations. With these rising costs, the uninsured are often 
unable to afford necessary medical procedures, such as preventative care or life-saving 
treatments. Thus, Democrats felt that it was the federal government’s fiduciary duty to 
reform the healthcare system to make high quality healthcare services affordable and 
available to every American citizen.11 
II. The Act 
 
The Act seeks to accomplish this goal through a number of key provisions. It 
requires each state to establish health insurance exchanges that will offer a marketplace 
for the comparison and purchasing of healthcare insurance policies. States must set up a 
marketplace where individuals or small businesses can enter to receive as much 
information as possible about their options with respect to health plan benefits, 
premiums, and other statistics that they might find useful in making their healthcare 
insurance decisions. In addition, all of the policies that are on display at these exchanges 
have to meet a number of criteria that the Congress has established as the baseline for 
“qualified health plans” that they feel all Americans need in order to have access to 
                                                
10 Lee, Christie. “Number of people without health insurance climbs.” CNN. September 
13, 2011. Accessed March 6, 2012. http://www.money.cnn.com 
/2011/09/13/news/economy/census_bureau_health_insurance/index.htm. 
11 Peterson, Mark. “It Was a Different Time: Obama and the Unique Opportunity for 
Health Care Reform.” Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law. 36.3 (2011): 429-436. 
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dependable, high-quality healthcare.12 In several years, states may begin to petition the 
Congress for permission to establish their own framework for a healthcare exchange 
system, and the Congress may approve such independence if the proposed system meets 
the basic requirements as described by the Congress.  
To counter recent negative trends in the utilization of preventative care across 
low-income households, the Act also contains a provision that requires insurance 
companies to cover preventative care without requiring a co-payment. This has been 
implemented as a result of the recent emphasis healthcare professionals have placed on 
preventive care in saving lives and maintaining good standards of living. Studies have 
shown that individuals often fail to adequately respond to symptoms by visiting a health 
care professional because they are unable to part with the co-pay that insurance 
companies have grown accustomed to allowing physicians to charge based on simply 
visiting the doctor.13 Research has also shown that co-payments originated in order to 
reduce the frequency of patient visits from the point of view of the insurance company, 
and the Act’s framers wanted to allow patients to visit doctors to seek preventative care 
free of deterrents. In a move that further upset Republican voters and leaders, the PPACA 
includes a tax on so-called “Cadillac” insurance plans, which are defined based on the 
cost of coverage of the insurance plan.14 The Act places enormous limitations on health 
                                                
12 “Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act: Health Insurance Exchanges” National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners. April 20, 2010. Accessed on March 6, 2012. 
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_b_Exchanges.pdf 
13 “New Guidance Regarding PPACA Preventive Health Care Requirements” Day 
Pitney, LLP. July 27, 2010. Accessed March 6, 2012. 
http://www.daypitney.com/news/docs/dp_3262.pdf 
14 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 111, 2. (2010). 
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insurance company’s ability to price risk and to simply choose not to insure certain 
individuals.  
It establishes a number of regulations governing healthcare policies that prevents 
insurance companies from denying applicants based on pre-existing conditions. Thus, 
insurance companies are prevented from denying coverage – in either group or individual 
plan settings – to applicants because they have a particular illness that increases the 
likelihood of future health problems that would likely lead to substantially higher 
healthcare costs. Historically, insurance companies have required extensive personal 
background information and healthcare histories in order to adequately price the risk 
associated with each particular client. While the Act marginally allows for this practice to 
continue, it sets a limit to how wide the premium disparity based on individual facts may 
be. It further prevents insurance companies from denying coverage when they feel that 
the financial risk that insuring that applicant exposes them to exceeds the maximum 
premium that they are allowed to charge them. 
As a result, insurance companies have to shift the cost of insuring these 
individuals whose anticipated expenditures cannot be offset by their own premiums to 
others. They do this by raising the rates of other policyholders. From the rational actor 
economic theory’s perspective, this would lead to the adverse selection problem, which 
would cripple the healthcare insurance industry. This is based on the premise that 
individuals shopping for healthcare insurance generally know more about their own 
health than the insurance companies that insure them. If the premium charged were 
around the average cost to the entire group of applicants, people will use only accept 
plans that charge them less than or equal to their expected costs. For all those who feel 
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that the premium exceeds the value that they will need to get from healthcare services, 
they will reject the offer. This only leaves people whose anticipated costs exceed their 
premiums because the relatively healthy people – who forecast low future medical costs – 
drop out of the market. Thus, insurance companies have to raise premiums, which creates 
another group of relatively healthy individuals whose anticipated future costs are lower 
than their premiums. This cycle repeats until nearly everyone has quit the market and the 
only available plans are too costly to afford. 
III. The Individual Mandate and the Constitution 
 
Obama and other Democratic leaders knew that the adverse selection problem 
combined with the potential free-riding problem – where the uninsured would show up at 
emergency rooms and rely on taxpayers to foot their bill – would require a solution.  
They deduced that a requirement for all citizens to purchase health insurance or face a 
fine was necessary to make the remainder of the Act effective.15 This individual mandate, 
or minimum-coverage provision, prevents healthy individuals who anticipate their 
healthcare needs to be lower than the cost of an insurance premium from exiting the 
market without paying a penalty to subsidize others’ premiums. Thus, high-risk 
individuals can be charged a lower premium – a premium that is lower than a free 
capitalist market would charge given the financial risks that their pre-existing conditions 
or other distinguishing characteristics expose the insurance company to. The individual 
mandate imposes a penalty or fee to be administered through the Internal Revenue 
Service on any individual who has not attained a healthcare insurance plan through their 
                                                
15 Wulsin, Lucien. Individual Mandate: A Background Report. California Research 
Bureau 
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employer or through the newly formed state-run health insurance marketplace. The Act 
however takes into account families and individuals for whom the purchase of healthcare 
would be too expensive. If it would cost more than 8% of their gross earnings, they 
would not be on the hook for this fee.  
It is this individual mandate that has garnered the most negative publicity and 
drawn the sharpest attacks from critics. The majority of the American population 
supported the healthcare reform proposals until the addition of this minimum coverage 
provision. When President Obama announced this change in 2009, public opinion sharply 
fell off.  The Act had held a longstanding positive majority since the campaign for the 
2008 elections, but this majority quickly turned negative. Although polls have varied, 
they have consistently hovered around indicating that 60% of the population disapproves 
of this mandate.16 Before this, the Obama Administration and the Democratic party had 
been able to cite public support as a primary motivation for being able to “ram through” 
the partisan legislation However, the addition of this unpopular provision shifted the 
public’s perception of these actions from the thought that the Congress was enforcing the 
desires the American people at the polling booths to the ardent belief that it was ignoring 
their natural right to make their own decisions.17 
 While the individual mandate drew the most negative attention from the 
American public, there was still a large minority that felt that other provisions of the law 
were not in the country’s best interest. As a result, the Act has faced a plethora of 
                                                
16 “Obama and Democrat’s Health Care Plan Polls” Real Clear Politics.  Accessed March 
6, 2012. www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/other/obama_and_democrats_health_care-
1130.html 
17 Rigby, Elizabeth, Jennifer Hayes Clark, and Stacey Pelika. 2011. 
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constitutional challenges in the court system – mostly with the support of the Republican 
Party. Some political commentators have noted that Republicans were not at the bill’s 
signing with President Obama and other Democratic leaders because they were getting in 
line at the courthouse to file motions to challenge the Act’s constitutionality.18 This flurry 
of judicial activity has focused on four main constitutional issues: the commerce clause 
basis for individual mandate, the expansion of Medicare, the Anti-Injunction Act, and the 
severability of the individual mandate from the remainder of the Act. While the issue 
about Medicare expansion revolves around states’ rights and federalism, the other three 
constitutional challenges center on the individual mandate. 
 The Anti-Injunction Act is relevant because the Constitution grants the Congress 
the power to tax.19 If the Supreme Court determines that the individual mandate is a tax 
per the definitions provided in the Anti-Injunction Act, and that the Congress is therefore 
simply exercising its power to tax, then there is a good chance that they would find Act’s 
individual mandate constitutional. 20  However, the Anti-Injunction Act provides for 
another area of judicial decision: whether or not the plaintiffs have standing in the case. If 
the court rules that it is a tax, then it is likely that the Court will rule that they do not have 
standing to file the lawsuit because in cases of taxation, the Anti-Injunction Act dictates 
the tax has to be paid before it can be challenged in the court system. If the Court agrees 
with this interpretation, as the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals did in its ruling in Liberty 
v. Geithner, then the earliest that they would be able to rule on the constitutionality of any 
of the two other bases upon which the minimum coverage provision is being challenged 
                                                
18 Jacobs and Skocpol, 132. 
19 U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 8, cl. 1. 
20 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) 
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would be 2015, a year after when the provision kicks in and the tax is levied. Even if the 
Anti-Injunction Act results in the Court dismissing the lawsuit, the question of the 
constitutionality of the individual mandate and the implied expansion of the commerce 
clause will still need to be decided. 
 The debate over the constitutionality of the individual mandate in HHS v. Florida 
rests of the Commerce Clause and, by extension, the Necessary and Proper Clause. 
Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 reads, “[The Congress shall have Power] To regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian 
tribes.”21 Therefore, if it can be determined that the individual mandate is merely a 
regulation of commerce “among the several states,” and that the mandate is “necessary 
and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing,” then the Supreme Court should 
uphold the Act.22 However, if the opposite is true and it is decided that the individual 
mandate either falls outside of the confines of the regulation of interstate commerce or is 
not necessary for such regulation, then the Supreme Court will strike down the individual 
mandate provision of the Act. 
  
                                                
21 U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 8, cl. 3. 
22 U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 8, cl. 18. 
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Chapter 3: Development of the Commerce Clause, 1824-1936 
 
Today, it is widely accepted that the commerce clause is nearly plenary and “the 
single most important source of national power.”1 By the late 1930s, the commerce 
clause was being used to justify a myriad of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s progressive 
programs. In 1959, constitutional scholars were arguing that the Court’s interpretation of 
the commerce clause had led to the “virtual abandonment of limits to the federal 
commerce clause.” This expansion of power was hardly anticipated by the Founders, who 
would not have agreed with the expansion of the meaning of commerce that has taken 
place to justify these actions.2 How then, has the Congress’ authority under the commerce 
clause raised to such great heights given the limited intent with which it was written? 
Although its powers were initially expanded in the early 19th century, the commerce 
clause was fairly well guarded by the Court until 1936. The Court implemented a number 
of restrictions during this hundred-plus year period and temporarily prevented the the 
commerce clause from growing to one of the federal government’s most important bases 
of power over the states and citizens that it has become today. 
I. The Marshall Court (1801-1835) 
 
 Gibbons v. Ogden (1824), also commonly known as the Steamboat Case, marked 
the beginning of the rapid expansion of the powers of the commerce clause. Nearly 200 
                                                
1 Johnson, Calvin H. “The Panda’s Thumb: The Modest and Mercantilist Original 
Meaning of the Commerce Clause,” Williams & Mary Bill of Rights Journal 13, no 1 
(2004) 3. 
2 Berger, Raoul. Federalism: The Founders’ Design (Norman: University of Oklahoma, 
1987) 122. 
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years later, many consider it a “masterpiece of bold assertion, coupled with discrete 
sidestepping.”3 The State of New York granted Robert Livingston and Robert Fulton the 
exclusive right to navigate steamboats between New York City and Albany. Aaron 
Ogden was licensed by this Livingston-Fulton syndicate to operate a steamboat between 
Elizabeth, New Jersey and New York City. When Thomas Gibbons began carrying 
passengers by steamboat between the same two cities, Ogden sued him in the New York 
chancery court.4 Gibbons argued that the Livingston-Fulton monopoly, under which 
Ogden brought him to court, violated the commerce clause and the license that the 
Congress gave him under the Coastal Licensing Act. The highest court in the New York 
judicial system rejected this viewpoint, but Chief Justice John Marshall’s opinion 
overturned its decision and thus started the evolution of the commerce clause into its 
current, nearly unfettered, form.  
 A question at the heart of this case was the definition of commerce. Must there be 
an exchange of goods for commerce to have occurred, and thus for the Congress to be 
able to regulate it? Aaron Ogden argued in the affirmative. He contended that the federal 
statute by which Gibbons was licensed was unconstitutional because it did not regulate 
the trading of commodities in any way. Since it did not regulate the buying or selling of 
goods, it could not be regulating commerce, and thus was not one of the Congress’ 
enumerated powers. 5  Marshall however, easily dismissed this by declaring that 
commercial activity covered a wide range of actions and was not to be construed 
                                                
3 Johnson, Herbert A. Gibbons v. Ogden: John Marshall, Steamboats, and the Commerce 
Clause (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2010) 104. 
4 ibid, 1. 
5 Coenen, Dan T. Constitutional Law: The Commerce Clause (New York: Foundation 
Press, 2004) 25. 
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narrowly.6 He purported that all Americans understood this to be the case.7 This is 
contrary to the fact that many legal scholars both now and then have not agreed that this 
wide definition of commerce is what the founders had in mind. He held that commerce is 
more than the mere trafficking of commodities, and that it is also intercourse, a definition 
under which navigation falls. Gibbons v. Ogden marked the beginning of the extension of 
the meaning of commerce beyond its traditional definition. The court decided that 
navigation was commerce as well, and therefore the Congress had the authority, 
superseding the states, to regulate it.8 This plenary power could not be infringed upon by 
the states. Marshall wrote that “this power […] is complete in itself, may be exercised to 
its utmost extend, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the 
constitution.”9 Marshall ruled that the Congress’ commerce power was plenary, and as 
such could control whatever moved in interstate commerce however it saw fit; this ruling 
has fueled the expansion of the commerce power for time to come. 
 The meaning of “among the several states” was also decided in this case to 
increase the Congress’ power. To construe this phrase strictly would have meant that the 
Congress could only regulate commerce when the parties involved were states. However, 
the opinion makes note of the founders’ usage of the word “among” rather than 
“between.” Thus, Marshall contended that any commercial activity – defined using the 
expanded meaning he reasoned earlier in the opinion – that occurred between state lines 
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in any fashion other than manufacturing constituted commerce “among the states.”10 
Marshall provided meaning to the previously undefined and un-litigated phrase “among 
the states,” and in doing so set a fairly broad precedent for its interpretation.11 
Even with this ruling that sided with the Congress’ power under the commerce 
clause and expanded the meaning of commerce, Gibbons v. Ogden put definite limits on 
the Congress’ power. Marshall wrote that his definition of commerce and interpretation 
of the phrase “among the states” were not without reasonable boundaries. Commerce 
which was “completely internal, which is carried on between man and man in a State, or 
between different parts of the same State, and which does not extend to or affect other 
States” could not be regulated by the Congress. He concluded, “such a power would be 
inconvenient and is certainly unnecessary.” 12 Regardless of how broadly he was willing 
to define the term “among,” Marshall could not fathom a reasonable definition of the 
word that would include commerce entirely conducted within a single state. The framers 
would surely have used a more suitable phrase had they intended the commerce clause to 
give the Congress the power to regulate commerce that occurs entirely within one state. 
Even with the monumental increase in the power of the commerce clause provided by 
Gibbons v. Ogden, it placed limits. Gibbons sets the precedent that a commercial activity 
must extend to or affect other states; if not, it was only intrastate commerce, and as such 
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not subject to the Congress’ regulatory powers.13 However, as time has gone on, these 
limits have been strained or broken. 
The Marshall Court heard two more cases on the commerce clause. In Brown v. 
Maryland (1827), Marshall struck down a state tax on businesses that were importing or 
selling foreign goods. He based this partially on the commerce clause and its support of 
the supremacy of the Congress’s Federal Tariff Act, which barred states from imposing 
any tariffs on imports and ensured that wholesalers could sell their goods free of state 
interference.14 Marshall added that this would also prohibit the same action between 
states. The Court’s opinion in Willson v. The Black-Bird Creek Marsh Company (1829) 
showed a slight hesitance to giving the commerce clause complete power.15 Similar to 
Gibbon v Ogden, it was a federal coasting license dispute that brought the issue to court. 
The state condoned the building of a dam that limited the creek’s navigability, and thus 
prevented a licensed steamboat operator from using it. However, Marshall did not strike 
down the authorization of the dam because it was not an act “repugnant to the power to 
regulate commerce in its dormant state,” but rather a valid exercise of the state’s police 
power and for the improvement of the general health of its citizens. Marshall reiterated 
the distinction between interstate and intrastate commerce, which he had introduced in 
Gibbons.16  
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II. Limitations on the Commerce Power 
 
Following Marshall’s death in 1835, there was a period of comparative silence for 
the issue of the congressional power under the commerce clause until 1888. The only 
cases the Court legislated on during this period revolved around the so-called dormant 
commerce clause – the question over whether states could pass legislation in areas that 
the Congress had the enumerated authority to act, but had not yet done so. Cooley v. 
Board of Wardens (1852) marked one notable exception to this period of calm. This 
decision shifted the Supreme Court’s focus from the nature and extent of the power under 
the commerce clause to the actual subjects it regulated.17 Cooley made it clear that when 
the subject in question was national in nature, it was under the exclusive control of the 
Congress and its commerce clause powers. When the subject was local in nature, it could 
be left to the states.18 When the subjects were “local” in their nature, the state’s police 
power provided exclusion to the Congress’ commerce power. The activity changes from 
local to national, and is thus governable by the federal government, when “a commodity 
has begun to move as an article of trade from one State to another.”19 This marked an 
important change in the Court’s focus as the nature of the commerce power was more 
readily accepted and they now shifted to the cases in which the decision revolved around 
whether or not the activities governed by this power were local or national in nature. 
A differentiation between manufacturing and commerce was made clear in Kidd 
v. Pearson (1888). While the Congress had the ability to regulate commerce on a national 
level, the Kidd decision limited the meaning of commerce. In this case, Iowa had banned 
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the manufacture of alcohol within their state lines. The law further noted that it was not 
limiting the importation of intoxicating liquors, so long as they remained in the original 
cases in which they were imported and obeyed all laws of the United States. The Court 
ruled that such an act does not conflict with the commerce power by attempting to 
regulate commerce among the states, even if the manufactures of the spirits intended to 
ship them across state lines after they were produced. 
Justice Lamar’s majority opinion acknowledges the difficulty in determining 
where the intersection between national and local activity occurs. He cites Daniel Ball 
(1870), which states that, “Whenever a commodity has begun to move as an article of 
trade from one state to another, commerce in that commodity between the states has 
commenced.”20 Therefore, Lamar decided that a good does not become national – and 
thus subject to the commerce power – at the point of manufacturing. It only stops being 
local in nature when it has been shipped or enters a common carrier for transport. 
Similarly to how Marshall explain the relation between commerce and intercourse, Lamar 
claimed that “no distinction is more popular to the common mind” that that between 
manufacturing and commerce. 
 This importance of the distinction between manufacturing and commerce in 
general was reiterated in a Hammer v. Dagenhart (1918). The Court again ruled that 
manufacturing in and of itself does not constitute commerce, and as such cannot be 
regulated. Furthermore, because manufacturing cannot be regulated, the process by which 
goods are manufactured cannot be regulated. Therefore, the Child Labor Act of 1915 and 
the Keating-Owen Act of 1918, which worked in tandem to prohibit the interstate sale of 
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commerce produced by child labor, were unconstitutional because they attempted to 
regulate the manufacturing process of certain goods under the commerce clause. Since 
the commerce clause was construed as unable to regulate manufacturing, the Supreme 
Court ruled that if the manufacturing process was entirely internal to a state, the Congress 
could not later ban the sale of the good because of the process by which it was 
manufactured.21  
Justice Day cited Gibbons and interpreted Marshall’s wording to be equivalent to, 
“the [commerce] power is one to control the means by which commerce is carried on, 
which is directly contrary of the assumed right to forbid commerce from moving and thus 
destroy it as to particular commodities.”22 In essence, the Hammer opinion decided that 
the Congress could not completely outlaw products, but could only regulate the 
commercial transactions that they took part in, and the means by which they were 
shipped.23 Because the statutes in question would result in the complete prohibition of 
these goods as a result of their manufacturing process, which occurred entirely inside of a 
single state, the commerce clause could not support their constitutionality. 
However, Day had to differentiate Hammer from the precedent set by Champion 
v. Ames (1903), also known as the Lottery Case, several years earlier. In Champion, the 
Supreme Court ruled that the commerce power included the ability to entirely prohibit the 
commerce of any item across state lines. In this case, it was lottery tickets. Day 
distinguished between the two cases, and thus did not feel he was overturning the Lottery 
Case. He wrote that Champion (and several sister cases decided around the same time 
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focusing on the same issue) involved goods that were innately harmful, and therefore the 
Congress had more leeway in prohibiting them.24 Without acknowledging whether or not 
child labor was intrinsically harmful, he wrote than “the goods shipped are of themselves 
harmless.” 25  Allowing these laws to stand would have effectively brought all 
manufacturing of any goods possibly destined for interstate commerce under federal 
control. This would have overturned the Kidd decision, as well as the numerous other 
decisions that differentiated the power the Congress had over commerce and the lack of 
authority they have over manufacturing.26 Thus, Hammer provided some limitation on 
the extension of the commerce power given by Champion. 
III. Stream-of-Commerce Doctrine and Affecting-Commerce Theory 
 
The ruling from Swift & Company v. United States (1905) provided some hope for 
those who wanted the commerce power to extend beyond the limitations Hammer put on 
it. This hope was based on the stream-of-commerce doctrine arising from Justice 
Holmes’ opinion in Swift.27 Using the Sherman Antitrust Act, an injunction was issued to 
stop meatpacking firms from holding cattle in Midwestern stockyards to drive up prices. 
Holmes held the Congress’ act constitutional using the commerce power, arguing that 
they could regulate the monopolies because their actions were a part of the stream of 
commerce. Even though the holding up of the cattle by delaying the transfer of title 
occurred entirely within a single state, the sale was a part of the stream of commerce 
whereby they were part of a constant and recurring course through which the cattle 
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always travelled into interstate commerce. Because the transfer of title was merely a stop 
along the way between the beginning and ending, the Sherman Antitrust Act could enjoin 
such action.  
Holmes wrote than, “commerce among the states is not a technical legal 
conception, but a practical one, drawn from the course of business.”28 Although their 
actions were technically entirely local, the fact that they were a part of this current of 
commerce allowed for them to be construed as national, and as such subject to the 
commerce power. This stream-of-commerce doctrine sought to further enlarge federal 
power under the commerce clause in Stafford v. Wallace (1922). Chief Justice Taft 
agreed, and allowed for the regulation of meatpackers based entirely in Chicago to be 
regulated because the “stockyards [were] but a throat through which the current” 
flowed.29 
These decisions left many questions unanswered, not the least of which asked 
how far into the business process would this stream-of-commerce doctrine would allow 
the Congress to extend its hand. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corporation v. United States 
(1935) and Carter v. Carter Coal Company (1936) answered this question. Both of these 
cases severely limited the substantive impact the steam-of-commerce doctrine could 
have. They made it clear that Swift did not decide, “that the interstate commerce power 
extended to the growth or production of the things which, after production, entered the 
flow.”30 Thus, they re-reaffirmed the barrier between commerce and manufacturing that 
had been set up by the likes of Hammer and Kidd, but had been recently overturned. In 
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Schechter Poultry, the Court ruled that the steam-of-commerce had stopped because the 
company only traded with intrastate buyers and suppliers. Therefore, any affect the 
company had on interstate commerce would be entirely indirect, not the direct effects that 
could be governed by the Congress. This distinction between an indirect and direct effect 
on interstate commerce was key. 
  This affecting-commerce theory is based on the notion that an action that affects 
interstate commerce can affect it either directly or indirectly, and this ultimately 
expanded the Congress’ commercial power. The commerce clause gives the Congress the 
power to regulate actions that directly affect interstate commerce. But, when the effect is 
indirect, the Congress does not have the ability to regulate it via the commerce clause. 
One of the most decisive cases that started using the affecting-commerce theory was 
Houston E. & W. T. Ry. Co. v. United States (1914), also referred to as the Shreveport 
Rate Case. The Court held that because the Congress would not have been able to 
regulate interstate commerce effectively, it could regulate intrastate commerce to that 
end.31 Thus, because these intrastate actions directly affected interstate commerce, they 
could be regulated under the commerce clause.32 
IV. Conclusion  
 
By the end of 1936, the Supreme Court had used a number of conditions that had 
to be met in order for the Congress to have the power under the commerce clause to 
regulate an activity. Most of these conditions focused on the difference between interstate 
and intrastate commerce, the pure latter of which the Congress had no authority to 
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regulate. Hammer, Kidd, and E.C. Knight Company showed the importance of the 
distinction between manufacturing and commerce – or production and distribution. This 
rule enabled the Court to simultaneously extend to states the ability to regulate or tax 
activities that were only production and limit the reach of the congressional commerce 
power.33 The stream-of-commerce doctrine and affecting-commerce theory were other 
tests provided by Swift and Shreveport; Schechter Poultry and Carter Coal limited the 
Congress’ ability to use these tests to extend of power. Between Gibbons and Carter 
Coal, the Court established the basic meaning of the commerce clause and implemented a 
number of rules that placed limitations on the Congress’ commerce power. This was 
merely the calm before the storm. Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 2nd New Deal legislation 
required the Court to have a different view of the commerce power than it had developed 
for over a hundred years, and he was determined to change the Court’s perspective. 
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Chapter 4: Development of the Commerce Clause, 1936-2012 
 
Gibbons resulted in an expansion of congressional power under the commerce 
clause, and decades later it was countered by cases like Cooley, Hammer, Schechter 
Poultry, and Carter Coal that worked to implement various tests and constraints to limit 
and restrict this power. This cycle repeated itself with the unprecedented expansion of the 
Court’s interpretation of commerce clause arising from Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 2nd New 
Deal and the subsequent attempt to mitigate that expansion which began under the 
Rehnquist Court. Although FDR’s “court-packing plan” failed to gain momentum in the 
Congress, many historians consider it as having successfully served its purpose by acting 
as the catalyst for the Court’s sudden shift in policy regarding the commerce clause 
between 1936 and 1937 to a position more favorable to FDR’s progressive programs.1 
The Court again dramatically expanded the reach and meaning of the commerce power in 
1937, and it only moved to curtail this power extension after the Rehnquist Court’s 
initiation in 1986. 
I. Roosevelt’s New Deal  
 
 FDR saw a plethora of his New Deal and Hundred Days legislation invalidated by 
the Court. The Court explained that these programs, even if they were objectively 
beneficial for the country, exceeded the Congress’ enumerated powers and were a far cry 
from the regulation of interstate commerce. The Court struck down nearly every 
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important provision of FDR’s New Deal legislation – save for the devaluation of the 
dollar and removal of the gold standard – in cases revolving around anything from 
railroad retirement accounts (Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R.R. Co., 1935) and 
subsidies under the Agricultural Adjustment Act (United States v. Butler, 1935) to 
women’s minimum wage laws (Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 1937).2 The Court 
based these rulings on the affecting-commerce theory and other precedents they had 
established, which had curtailed the Congress’ commerce power. This judicial 
interference in programs was very unpopular with the American public.3  
FDR’s 2nd New Deal involved a series of more progressive legislation. The 
Wagner Act, Public Utility Holding Company Act, and Social Security Act were about to 
be invalidated by the Court, if it followed precedent. To keep these programs in place, 
FDR resorted to proposing that the Congress increase the number of Supreme Court 
justices from nine to fifteen. Since he would choose justices sympathetic to his 
progressive programs, this would nearly ensure the Court’s acknowledgement of the 
constitutionality of key legislation. Although the Congress and the public reacted poorly 
to this plan, the Court issued several rulings that indicated it had changed its views on 
any perceived limits to the commerce power.4 This judicial revolution is referred to as a 
“change in time that saved nine.” Had the court not changed their perception of the scope 
of the commerce clause, it is likely that their invalidation of these new programs would 
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have given FDR enough support to pack the Court.5 It is important to note that the 
changes in the Court’s philosophies were not limited to its interpretation of the commerce 
clause. 
This “switch in time” began with the Court’s upholding of a minimum wage law 
in West Coast Hotel Company v. Parrish (1937) and of the National Labor Relations Act 
in National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation (1937) two 
weeks later.6 As mentioned earlier, the court revolutionized more than just its view of the 
commerce clause. Parrish overturned Adkins v. Children’s Hospital (1923) and ruled that 
freedom of contract could be violated if the state law protected the community as whole 
or small portions of it.7 The National Labor Relations Board decision, however, directly 
involved the commerce clause.  
Jones & Laughlin Steel involved a steel company that was alleged to have 
discriminated against workers who wanted to join a labor union. This violated the 
Wagner Act, which ensured equal treatment for union members and organizers. The 
NLRB, under the authorization of the Wagner Act and the National Labor Relations Act, 
required the steel company to rehire the workers and pay them for lost wages. However, 
district and appellate courts – using precedent established by the Supreme Court – ruled 
that the NLRB did not have the power under the commerce clause to take such an action. 
They ruled that, like in Hammer and Carter Coal, because the manufacturing process was 
entirely local in nature, and thus does not significantly affect interstate commerce, that 
the Congress could not impose those rules. 
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However, the Supreme Court overturned the lower courts’ decisions. The Court 
ruled that the NLRB had jurisdiction over any person involved in unfair labor practices 
that affected commerce, even if it were only in manufacturing processes. Chief Justice 
Hughes ruled that if activities were entirely intrastate in nature but had “such a close and 
substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to 
protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions,” the commerce power could reach 
it.8 Even though the employees were solely engaged in manufacturing, Hughes did not 
view this as determinative. Thus, the E.C. Knight and Carter Coal – the latter of which 
had only been decided the year before – were effectively dismissed. However, Hughes 
did not explicitly state this, but rather he only alluded to other grounds being the basis for 
which Carter Coal was decided. Even though the Court was unwilling to overturn the 
production-transportation distinction emphasized by Carter Coal based on judicial 
reasoning in this case, they used this case as the basis for their decision in Labor Board v. 
Friedman-Harry Marks (1937).9 Regardless of the fact that the company in the later case 
rarely entered into interstate commerce of any kind, the Court used Jones & Laughlin 
Steel to declare any doubt about the constitutionality of the labor boards’ action as 
“without merit.”10 Thus, it gave the Congress a new power. It allowed the Congress to 
regulate labor-management relations in private industry and business.11 
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Three years later, the Court overruled Hammer v. Dagenhart and further limited 
the application of Carter Coal in its decision in United States v. Darby (1941). This case 
completely eliminated the distinction between manufacturing and transportation. The Fair 
Labor Standards Act prohibited the interstate shipping of any goods that were produced 
under conditions that failed to meet its standards. The Court unanimously ruled that even 
though goods made in unfair labor conditions failed to be inherently bad in and of 
themselves, they still could be regulated because the Congress now had the authority to 
prohibit the interstate sale of any good it so deemed necessary.12 The court was able to 
rationalize the effect these labor practices had on interstate commerce by pointing out 
that unfair labor conditions could lead to strikes, which would in turn affect interstate 
commerce, and because poor labor conditions could drive down labor conditions in other 
states. Citing Marshall’s plenary view of the commerce clause, Darby essentially 
eliminated the prevailing distinction between direct and indirect effects on interstate 
commerce. Any activity that affected interstate commerce in any fashion was subject to 
the Congress’ authority via the commerce clause.13 The Congress had the authority to 
control entirely internal concerns of the state if control of these concerns were necessary 
to achieve the plenary authority granted to it by the Constitution.14 
One of the most remarkable examples of the expansion of the commerce clause 
resulting from New Deal legislation is Wickard v. Filburn (1942).15 In this well-known 
case, a farmer, Roscoe Filburn, was growing wheat on his own farm for personal 
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consumption in excess of the maximum amount of wheat allowed per acre established by 
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938. Filburn argued that since the wheat he grew never 
became interstate commerce – or commerce of any kind for that matter – because he 
grew it for his own use, the Congress lacked the authority to regulate it under the 
commerce clause.  
However, the Court disagreed. They ruled that because the purpose of the act was 
to regulate national wheat prices, and by not buying wheat on the national market Filburn 
affected the national price of wheat, Filburn had an effect on interstate commerce. Even if 
his actions did not have a substantial effect on interstate commerce, the combination of 
numerous farmers doing the same would have a substantial effect. Furthermore, the 
distinction between direct and indirect effects on interstate commerce that was declared a 
part of a “fundamental … maintenance of our constitutional system,” had been tossed 
aside.16 An activity that is not inherently commercial in nature could now be regulated 
under the commerce clause. Thus, the precedent was set for the Congress to regulate any 
activity – local or national in nature – if a rational basis existed for its effect on interstate 
commerce.17 
II. The Rehnquist Court 
 
 The Court’s enlarged view of the scope of the commerce clause went essentially 
unchecked from 1942, when Wickard was decided, until 1995, when the Rehnquist Court 
addressed the commerce power for the first time. The basis that an activity had any effect 
on interstate commerce was used to justify a myriad of congressional regulations. 
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Following Chief Justice Warren Burgers’ retirement in 1986, the Rehnquist Court began 
issuing a number of decisions that limited federal power in favor of states’ rights. One 
major area around which the Court differed from historical decisions was the commerce 
clause. The Court issued meaningful decisions in U.S. v Lopez (1995), U.S. v. Morrison 
(2000), and Gonzales v. Raich (2005). In both Lopez and Morrison, the Court put a limit 
on the Court’s increasingly expansive interpretation of the commerce power for the first 
time since Jones & Laughlin Steel and Wickard v. Filburn.18 While these two cases 
seemed to be part of the cycle of responding to broad decisions, as seen earlier, Gonzales 
v. Raich once again set the Court back in the direction of an expansive commerce power. 
A. United States v. Lopez (1995) 
U.S. v. Lopez was the first Supreme Court decision to rule against the 
government’s use of the commerce power in over sixty years. Alfonso Lopez was a high 
school student who was convicted of violating a federal law, the Gun Free School Zones 
Act of 1990, after carrying a revolver on school premises. Lopez challenged his 
conviction on the basis that the regulation of Texas’ public schools went beyond the 
constitutional powers of the Congress. The district judge rejected this viewpoint, arguing 
that the regulation was a valid exercise of the commerce power because the “business of 
elementary, middle, and high school” affects interstate commerce. The Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals overturned this ruling, but did so in a fashion very favorable for the 
government. It ruled that the government had not established a strong enough link 
between the act and an effect on interstate commerce. If the Congress were able to give 
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more evidence to support the existence of such an effect on interstate commerce, the 
Appeals Court indicated it would have no problem accepting it as a valid exercise of the 
commerce power. 
The Supreme Court affirmed the Appeals Court’s decision, but did so on grounds 
much less reminiscent of Wickard v. Filburn than the Appeal Court’s opinion. In a 5-4 
decision, the Court ruled that the Act exceeded congressional authority over the 
commerce clause. Chief Justice Rehnquist chose to write the opinion of the Court 
himself, as this was a major departure from decades of precedents. Rehnquist 
acknowledges the three categories of authority that the Court has recognized for activities 
that the Congress may regulate under the commerce clause: (1) the use of the channels of 
interstate commerce (2) regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, 
and (3) activities that have a substantial relation to and affect on interstate commerce.  
The Court altered the third category. It argued that case law has never declared 
that the Congress “may use a relatively trivial impact on commerce as an excuse for the 
broad regulation of state or private activities.” Thus, the affect on interstate commerce 
cannot be a mere insignificant one upon which the only constitutional basis of the act 
relies. Thus, it was decided that the proper test of the constitutionality of an act requires 
an analysis of whether or not the regulated activity “substantially affects” interstate 
commerce. The first two categories were quickly discarded as not being applicable to the 
case in any way. The Court concluded that it did not fall under the third category’s 
protection because it was not an activity that substantially affected interstate commerce. 
In making this determination, the court further analyzed precedent with respect to 
economic versus non-economic activity. The Court looked at numerous cases where the 
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Court perceived the effect on interstate commerce to warrant the invocation of the 
commerce clause, and came to the conclusion that these were all economic activities. 
Regulations on coal mining, wages, and labor disputes are some examples of the 
economic activities that the Court had said affected interstate commerce. The Court 
explained that even Wickard, considered one of the most far reaching expansions of the 
commerce power, involved an economic activity in a way that Lopez did not. Wickard 
was about the growth of wheat, an item a short step away from entering the realm of 
commerce. Filburn was ruled against because his intrastate activity had to be regulated in 
order to ensure the Congress’ effective regulation of interstate commerce. However, the 
Court was unable to find such a connection between carrying a gun in a school zone and 
commerce, let alone interstate commerce. It was a non-economic activity that could not 
be shown to have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. The Act regulated a non-
economic activity the failed to pass the substantive effect test. 
The government tried to argue the possession of a firearm in a school zone 
substantially affects interstate commerce because it could lead to a violent crime. Violent 
crime can affect interstate commerce in two ways: the cost of – and insurance against – 
violent crimes are substantial throughout the whole population and the unsafe perception 
created by violent crimes would reduce the willingness of people to travel throughout the 
country. Furthermore, violent crimes on school premises would handicap the educational 
process, which would in turn affect interstate commerce when the pupil’s turned out less 
productive economically. Because guns in school could limit national productivity, they 
could be regulated under the auspices of interstate commerce. 
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The Court was unmoved by the argument because it felt that it would essentially 
authorize a general federal police power. Analyzing the cost of crime would lead the 
Congress to having the authority to not just regulate violent crime, but also to regulate 
any activity that could lead to violent crime, and then in turn affect interstate commerce – 
without care for how related the economic activity the crime-affecting action was. 
Furthermore, the court saw virtually no limits to congressional power under the 
commerce clause if it accepted the “national productivity” theory. Using this theory, the 
Congress could regulate anything from family law to dietary requirements if it found a 
connection to the economic productivity of its population. They conclude that accepting 
the government’s argument would posit a scenario in which the Court would be hard 
pressed to find any activity that the Congress could not tie back to interstate commerce 
and thus not be able to regulate. 
Lopez held that the “possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an 
economic activity that might through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of 
interstate commerce.” Lopez was a local student at a local high school who was in no 
way recently involved in interstate commerce. It was similarly not proven that the firearm 
had any ties to interstate commerce. It would require the piling of “inference upon 
inference” to uphold the constitutionality of the statute.19 While Rehnquist recognizes 
that earlier cases had made steps down this road “giving great deference to congressional 
action,” such suppositions would eliminate any remaining distinction between national 
and local. Unwilling to do this, the Court used Lopez to rein in the runaway power that 
the commerce clause had become since Wickard. Thus, the court held, “where economic 
                                                
19 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) 
 39 
activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating the activity with 
be sustained.” The addition of the words “economic” and “substantially” are what served 
to break the chain of Court decisions increasingly strengthening the Congress’ commerce 
power. 
B. United States v. Morrison (2000) 
The Violence Against Women Act of 1994 created a means through which 
victims of gender-motivated violence could seek remedies in civil court. Christy 
Brzonkala sued Antonio Morrison and James Crawford after alleging that they had 
assaulted and raped her. When Morrison moved to dismiss the complaint on the basis that 
the Act’s civil remedy provision was unconstitutional, the United States intervened to 
defend the Act’s constitutional basis. An en banc panel of the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that the Congress lacked the authority to implement such a civil remedy 
provision under either the enforcement powers drawn from section five of Fourteenth 
amendment or the commerce clause in Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and State 
University, which were the two sources of power that the Congress explicitly stated they 
had relied upon in the act. The equal protection clause’s relevance to this case is beyond 
the scope of this paper and will not be discussed beyond to say that it was found 
insufficient to justify the act by the Supreme Court. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist used United States v. Lopez (1995) as one of the major 
precedents in his majority opinion for the court that ultimately concluded that the federal 
civil remedy provided by the act exceeds the congress’ authority under the commerce 
clause. The Court mentions, just as it had done in Lopez, that the Congress had been 
given significant latitude under the commerce clause since Jones & Laughlin Steel – 
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much more than previous case law would have allowed. Morrison reiterated the fact that 
even with the modern interpretation of the commerce clause, the Congress’ regulatory 
authority was not without effective boundaries. The government attempted to use the 
third category of activity for which the Congress may regulate under its commerce 
power. Drawing from Lopez and Jones & Laughlin Steel, the commerce power gave the 
Congress the ability to regulate activities that have a substantial relation to or affect on 
interstate commerce. 
The distinction between an activities being of an economic nature versus a non-
economic nature was an important factor in the Court’s opinion. This fact, along with the 
many other holdings in the case, mirrors Lopez. The court cites Lopez’s holding regarding 
the review of historical commerce clause case law. In the cases where the Court used the 
third category, of substantially affecting interstate commerce, to uphold the regulation of 
the activity in question, the activity had always been economic in nature. In one way or 
another, there was a reasonable link that could be drawn between the action that was 
being regulated and commerce. However, there was no such link for the activities 
regulated in Lopez or Morrison. 
The Court found that by no stretch of the imagination could it be found that 
gender-motivated crimes of violence were economic activity.20 Furthermore, the court 
found no jurisdictional element in Morrison that established a link between the act and 
interstate commerce. The fact that the Congress claimed that such a substantial link 
existed, was not sufficient for making it so. Instead, the decision as to the extent of the 
link’s effect on interstate commerce was a judicial rather than legislative question, and as 
                                                
20 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) 
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such could only be determined by the Supreme Court, as mentioned in Lopez. Thus, the 
congressional findings that attempted to add the jurisdictional element were not sufficient 
in the Court’s eyes. The Court emphasized the requirement for the distinction between 
what is truly national and what is truly local. As such, the Court solidified the Lopez 
decision’s limitation on the expansion of the Congress’ power to regulate activity under 
the commerce clause. 
C. Gonzales v. Raich (2005) 
 Unlike the previous two decisions that worked to contain the expansion of the 
Congress’ powers under the commerce clause, Gonzales v. Raich (2005) upheld the 
federal law in question. A number of Angel Raich’s marijuana plants were seized or 
destroyed by Drug Enforcement Agency agents working under the authority of the 
Controlled Substances Act. Raich sued for injunctive and declarative relief based on the 
fact that the CSA outlawed her possessing, obtaining, or manufacturing of cannabis for 
their personal, medical use. She argued that the act violated the commerce clause, the due 
process clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Ninth and Tenth amendments, and the 
doctrine of medical necessity. Again, for purposes of this paper, only the challenge to the 
authority granted by the commerce clause shall be discussed. 
 The majority opinion, written by Justice Breyer, concluded that the CSA was a 
valid exercise of the Congress’ power to regulate interstate markets for medicinal 
substances, even if those substances were produced and consumed locally. Raich argued 
that the CSA’s categorical prohibition of the manufacture and possession of marijuana for 
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medical purposes […] exceeds Congress’ authority under the commerce clause.”21 The 
Court rejected the “separate class of activities” based on the medical nature of the 
marijuana. Thus, the claim can be boiled down to the belief that entirely locally cultivated 
products sold locally rather than on the open market, are not subject to federal regulation. 
However, the Court cites Wickard v. Filburn to refute that claim. The large magnitude of 
the commercial market for marijuana was undisputed, and as such the Court used 
precedent to rule it a valid application of the Congress’ commerce power. 
 The Court found that the test of the third category allowed the Congress to 
regulate purely local activities if they have a substantial affect on interstate commerce. 
This allowance of federal regulation of entirely local, intrastate activities began with 
Wickard. Similarly to how the existence of wheat on Gibbon’s farm might have prompted 
him to sell it at some point when wheat prices rose and thus inhibit the Congress’ ability 
to stabilize wheat prices, the Congress’ ability to eliminate the commercial transaction of 
marijuana altogether is inhibited by the existence of the locally grown marijuana. Thus, it 
was not difficult for the Court to determine that a rational basis existed for believing that 
the concerns that the local cultivation and use of marijuana hindered the ability of the 
Congress to regulate the interstate commerce of marijuana. 
 The court differentiated Raich from its earlier two commerce clause cases. Unlike 
those two cases, the cultivation and usage of medical marijuana constituted economic 
activity. Furthermore, the CSA was designed to regulate that interstate commerce.22 
Unlike the Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990, the CSA’s prohibition of marijuana was 
                                                
21 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 14 (2005) 
22 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 9 (2005) 
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considered an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, and that 
regulation would be undercut without the regulation of intrastate activity. The previous 
two cases were noneconomic in nature, and this fact contributed to their decisions. The 
Court cited Morrison, in declaring that “where economic activity substantially affects 
interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be sustained.” The Court 
found that the intrastate, noncommercial growth, possession, and use of marijuana was 
within the realm of activities that the Congress could regulate under the commerce 
clause. Because it was an economic activity and the exemptions for which can be clearly 
seen to significantly impact the interstate supply and demand sides of the market, the 
Court ruled that it substantially affected interstate commerce.  
III. Conclusion 
 
 The New Deal and seventy years afterwards saw a rapid expansion of the Court’s 
perception of the Congress’ commerce power. Lopez and Morrison ended that expansion. 
Their holdings only partially rolled back Congress’ power as they focused on whether or 
not the affect an activity had on interstate commerce was “substantial” and required that 
for any activity to be regulated under the commerce clause, it, in and of itself, had to be 
economic in nature. Many view Raich as a turn away from Lopez and Morrison and an 
indication that the court is leaning more towards a New Deal-style perception of the 
commerce clause. However, it is important to note than neither Lopez nor Morrison 
overturned Wickard v. Filburn; rather, they differentiated themselves from it because 
they were non-economic activities. Raich did not breach this distinction between 
economic and non-economic activities. In fact, Raich used this distinction to explain its 
ruling. Although some might argue with the extent to which the growth and use of 
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marijuana is an economic activity, they are certainly more of an economic activity than 
the possession of guns on school premises or a gender-motivated hate crime. Lopez, 
Morrison, and Raich supported a contractive response to the New Deal’s expansion of the 
commerce power, by focusing the court on the bearing the distinction between economic 
and non-economic activities has on the activities’ ability to substantially affect interstate 
commerce. 
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Chapter 5: Briefs in Health and Human Services v. Florida 
 
 The minimum coverage provision, or individual mandate provision, of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119) is the focus of 
myriad lawsuits challenging its constitutionality. This issue reached its pinnacle in HHS 
v. Florida (No. 11-398). In this case, the petitioner is the Department of Health and 
Human Services. The respondents filed two briefs as they are broken down into two 
groups: state respondents and private respondents. The question for which the writ of 
certiorari was granted is, “whether the congress had the power under Article I of the 
Constitution to enact the minimum coverage provision.” The commerce clause and the 
necessary and proper clause are the two aspects of Article I that are at the center of this 
debate. The petitioners seek to overturn the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit’s 
decision that the individual mandate exceeded the constitutional authority given to it by 
Article I, while the respondents argue that the appellate court’s decision should be 
upheld. The briefs enter into discussions regarding the Congress’ taxing power as another 
basis for the constitutionality of the minimum coverage provision, but this paper only 
focuses on whether or not the commerce clause authorizes the Congress to maintain such 
a provision.  
I. Fundamental Differences between the Parties 
 
 The major disagreements between the petitioners and the respondents can be 
boiled down to several differences in interpretation. They both acknowledge that the 
Congress is a legislative body of enumerated and limited powers, but they disagree about 
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whether or not the enforcement of the individual mandate is a part of the affirmative 
grant of power given by the commerce clause and the necessary and proper clause. First, 
while the respondents view the individual mandate under the commerce clause as an 
unprecedented expansion of power, the petitioners see it as an anticipated evolution due 
to the new type of federal government that has developed since the New Deal. Second, 
the respondents claim that if it is deemed constitutional, it would be very difficult to 
imagine the boundaries that could be placed on the Congress, but the petitioners dismiss 
this argument by characterizing the healthcare market as a unique market unlike any 
other and do not feel that a threat exists as a result of these unique circumstances. The 
third major difference is their perception of the minimum coverage provision as a 
regulation of inactivity or activity, and whether or not this distinction matters. Another 
major different is their views on both the answer to and the premise of the question about 
whether or not the necessary and proper clause lets the Congress fix problems it created 
by its exercise of other powers. While these are not all of the disagreements gleaned from 
the briefs of HHS v Florida on the individual mandate, they are the key differences that 
are likely to have the most bearing on the Supreme Court’s upcoming ruling. 
II. Brief for Petitioners 
 
 The federal government purports that the minimum coverage provision is a 
constitutional act of the Congress for two reasons. First, it is a necessary component of a 
large scheme of the regulation of interstate commerce that is within the Congress’ 
enumerated powers; without the provision, this broader scheme would be ineffective. The 
second basis for the government’s argument is independent of this broader scheme. The 
minimum coverage provision in and of itself regulates economic conduct that has a 
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substantial effect on interstate commerce, and is therefore constitutional even without 
being part of a larger scheme of interstate ecommerce regulation.1 The petitioners 
conclude their argument for the constitutionality of the provision under the commerce 
clause by claiming that the clause does not prohibit the regulation of inactivity, but even 
if it did, the minimum coverage provision is a regulation of activity rather than 
inactivity. 2  Therefore, the Congress has the constitutional authority to enforce the 
provision. 
The United States’ brief for the petitioners begins by explaining the current state 
of the healthcare in this country. It reminds the Justices of the importance of healthcare, 
as it states that the market accounts for 17.6% of our national economy. The primary 
means of payment in this market is insurance, but many cannot afford it or are denied 
coverage due to pre-existing conditions. The brief cites Congressional Budget Office 
statistics of 2009 that claim that payments by health insurance companies and 
government programs accounted for 84% of national spending on healthcare. However, 
the uninsured still consume healthcare without being able to pay for it at the time of 
service. The government argues that the participation of the uninsured in the healthcare 
market shifts risks and costs to the other market participants. Because state and federal 
laws require emergency rooms to treat patients regardless of their insurance status, the 
uninsured are still able to participate in the healthcare market. However, some research 
indicates that the uninsured are unable to pay up to 63% of their medical bills. Because 
healthcare providers are unable to collect the fees from these uninsured individuals, they 
                                                
1 Department of Health and Human Services v. State of Florida, No. 11-398. Brief for 
Petitioners (Minimum Coverage Provision), 33. 
2 HHS v. Florida, Brief for Petitioners, 50. 
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are forced to pass the costs onto other market participants. The Congress has estimated 
that these costs are passed on to insured families to the tune of $1,000 a year.3 The brief 
also summarizes the Act and the history of attempted reforms on American healthcare.4 
 The brief argues for the broad power that the Congress is given by the commerce 
and necessary and proper clauses. It cites Gonzales v. Raich in concluding that the 
Congress may regulate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce even if they 
are purely local activities, so long as they are economic in nature.5 Furthermore, the 
Congress need not prove that the activity substantially affects interstate commerce, only 
that a rational basis exists for the belief that in aggregate the activities could affect 
interstate commerce.6 The necessary and proper clause makes it clear that the federal 
government has the power to enact any laws that are useful to this end.7 The minimum 
coverage provision is necessary to effectuate the Congress’ otherwise legitimate ends, 
and as such the Court should show the Congress great deference to its decisions as to how 
to meet its goal. It is an integral part of the Act’s end to discriminatory practices in the 
individual healthcare insurance market because, without this provision, many individuals 
would wait to purchase health insurance until they believed that they needed care. And, 
as a result of the guaranteed-issue and community-rating provisions, they would be able 
to get this insurance. Because the Court has historically shown great deference to the 
Congress in determining how to accomplish its regulation of interstate commerce, the 
minimum coverage provision should be upheld. 
                                                
3 ibid, 8. 
4 ibid, 14. 
5 ibid, 22. 
6 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 17 (2005) 
7 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819) 
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 The activities that the minimum coverage provision regulates are the “economic 
and financial decisions about how and when health care is paid for and when health 
insurance is purchased”8 Under the assumptions of the various other provisions of the 
Act, some individuals would choose not to purchase healthcare insurance until they 
needed it, which would push financial risks to insurance companies and healthcare 
providers, quite possibly across interstate lines. Therefore, the activity that the Congress 
is allowed to regulate is the foregoing of purchasing health insurance. Based on the size 
of the healthcare industry in dollar terms, the brief does not find it difficult to consider 
this decision an economy activity. Therefore, citing United States v. Morrison, it argues 
that the provision should be sustained because it regulates an economic activity that 
substantially affects interstate commerce.9  
 The federal government directly challenges the basis upon which the court of 
appeals based their decision to overturn the minimum coverage provision. The court of 
appeals acknowledged that the Congress could require individuals who “consume health 
care to pay for it with insurance when doing so.”10 It found that requiring people to 
maintain health insurance is proper in regulating the method of payment in the market for 
healthcare. The appeals court justices, as well as the respondents, make a distinction 
between requiring individuals to have healthcare insurance when they file their taxes and 
when they receive medical care. The petitioners interpret this requirement for the 
regulation of behavior at the point of consumption to infringe upon the Congress’ 
                                                
8 HHS v. Florida, Brief for Petitioners, 33. 
9 ibid, 34. 
10 Ibid, 118a-119a. 
 50 
aforementioned ability to decide how best to achieve its objectives.11 They argue that 
focusing on the point of consumption is illogical for an issue regarding healthcare 
insurance because the healthcare insurance market would never survive financially if 
people were allowed to get insurance on their way to the hospital, and therefore the 
congress was reasonable in requiring insurance before consumption.12 Furthermore, given 
the societal view the denial of emergency medical care is immoral, requiring people to 
have healthcare insurance when they need emergency medical care would be 
inappropriate. 
  The petitioners also had to differentiate this case from Lopez and Morrison, both 
of which the appeals court partially based their decision on to overturn the minimum 
coverage provision. They read Lopez as overturning the federal prohibition of guns on 
school premises because it was not an essential part of a larger regulation of economic 
activity. Furthermore, the prohibition itself is, in no way, an economic activity nor could 
it possibly affect interstate commerce in a substantial way.13 Any connection to interstate 
commerce was too contrived to make it a valid execution of the commerce power. 
Similarly, gender-motivated crime, which was the issue in Morrison, was in no way an 
economic activity; the Court rejected the same attenuated effects they might have on 
interstate commerce.14 However, the minimum coverage provision, which regulates how 
people pay for their healthcare, is quintessentially economic in nature. They argue that 
this economic activity directly affects interstate economic and commercial activity, 
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13 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) 
14 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) 
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unlike the activities of Lopez or Morrison. Furthermore, neither of those two cases 
reasonably purported that the regulation of either respective activity was a part of a larger 
regulatory scheme aimed at regulating interstate commerce. 
 The final hurdle that petitioners attempt to jump is the notion that the Congress 
cannot regulate “inactivity.” They argue that there is no textual support in the commerce 
clause or in case law to indicate that there is any limitation on the regulation of inactivity. 
They argue that at the time the constitution was written, the meaning of regulate meant 
“to direct,” which in turn meant “to order; to command.”15 Thus, they conclude that when 
it was written, the commerce clause had intended for the Congress to be able to require 
individual to take action under the auspices of regulation. They further saw, at the time of 
the founding, no limitation on the term “commerce” to “existing commerce.” The Court 
disregarded content-based or subject-matter distinctions between 
production/manufacturing and transportation as well as direct and indirect effects in 
Lopez as not being appropriate for the “new ear of federal regulation under the commerce 
power.” 16  Therefore, petitioners contend that the distinction between activity and 
inactivity is based on mere “semantic or formalistic categories” which attempt to 
distinguish between activities that are considered commerce and those that are not so 
considered. They use Wickard to emphasize that the Court should use a practical 
approach and not give controlling influence to nomenclature. 
 Yet, they also contend that their regulation of people’s decisions about whether or 
not to buy healthcare insurance is still a regulation of activity, not inactivity. This is 
                                                
15 HHS v. Florida, Brief for Petitioners, 48. 
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because the uninsured, as a class, are active in the market because they regularly look for 
and receive healthcare services. Therefore, they are regulating this activity of getting 
healthcare by requiring them to do so through and pay for by insurance. Choosing self-
insurance is as much an activity as choosing private-insurance. Based on the assumption 
that the uninsured will still have to use healthcare, the minimum coverage provision only 
regulates the way in which they finance what they consume.17 They construe Wickard’s 
holding that the Congress could restrict the extent “to which one may forestall resort to 
the market” as allowing the Congress to similarly requiring individuals to “resort to the 
market” for insurance rather than self-insure.18 In addition, since uninsured individuals 
shift risk from themselves to the rest of the market, it is an activity. The fact that they 
choose to externalize their risk to other market participants makes their choice not to get 
insurance a commercial activity. 
III. Brief for Respondents 
 
 It is clear from the beginning of their briefs that the respondents’ focus will be on 
the difference between regulating commerce and compelling individuals to enter into 
commerce. They argue that the individual mandates imposes an unprecedented 
requirement on American citizens that abolishes the principle of enumerated powers that 
are defined and limited.19 They challenge the government’s characterization of the 
individual mandate as regulating “the timing and method of financing the purchase of 
                                                
17 HHS v. Florida, Brief for Petitioners, 50. 
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19 Department of Health and Human Services v. State of Florida, No. 11-398. Brief for 
Private Respondents on the Individual Mandate, 7. 
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health care services.”20 Instead, they contend that this euphemistic description does not 
adequately describe what the provision does. They argue that upholding the minimum 
coverage provision would remove the last shred of a federal government with limited and 
enumerated powers. 
 The commerce power allows for the regulation of extant commerce, not for the 
introduction of new commerce by compelling individuals to enter into it. Lopez and 
Gonzales point out the three categories of activities that the Congress may regulate under 
the commerce power: (1) channels of interstate commerce (2) instrumentalities of 
interstate commerce and (3) economic activities that substantially affect interstate 
commerce. 21 The regulation of inactivity is covered by none of these three categories. 
They point out that Gibbons defined the commerce power as the power “to prescribe the 
rule by which commerce is to be governed,” and to prescribe the means why which 
commerce shall be conducted. They argue that it is axiomatic that the phrase to “regulate 
commerce” implies that there must be commerce in existence to regulate. The power was 
not written by the founders to “compel individuals into commerce so that the Congress 
has something to regulate.” 22 The framers intended on giving the Congress the ability to 
regulate ongoing interstate commerce, not create commerce and impose rules on this new 
commerce to burden individuals. 
 The respondents analyze this distinction further via the surrounding text of Article 
1, Section 8 of the Constitution. They point out that in the only two other clauses that 
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give the Congress the power to regulate something, they first and separately give the 
Congress to ability to bring it into existence. The two examples provided are the ability to 
“coin money” being given before the ability to “regulate the value thereof” and the power 
to “raise and support Armies” and “provide and maintain a Navy” being conferred upon 
the Congress before the power to “make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the 
land and Naval Forces.”23 Had the framers intended, or had it been generally understood, 
that the power to bring into existence was a part of the power to regulate, they would not 
have needed to add these extra clauses. However, since this was not the case, they had no 
reason to think that the power to regulate interstate commerce could ever be construed to 
give the Congress the power to compel individuals to participate in market transactions. 
 They further point to the assumed absence of such a power, evident in the entire 
history of congressional legislation. There have been numerous times in the recent and 
distant past when the ability to compel people into commerce would have been viewed as 
a highly attractive option, if the Congress had thought that their commerce clause powers 
could extend that far. They point out how much easier it would have been for the 
Congress to simply compel individuals to buy wheat to stabilize prices than to enforce 
such a complicated system with subsidies and quotas that came up in Wickard with the 
hopes that indirectly it would maintain the desirable price level.24 As the Congress had to 
come up with intricate and creative means by which to stimulate the economy during the 
                                                
23 U.S. Constitution art. I., Section 8, clauses 5, 12-14 and HHS v. Florida, Brief for State 
Respondents, 19. 
24 HHS v. Florida, Brief for Private Respondents, 30. 
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Great Depression, the world wars, or the 2008 financial crisis, it never thought that it 
achieve this stimulation simply by forcing individuals to enter the market. 25   
 The respondents attack the characterization of the individual mandate purported 
by the government, which claims it is a regulation of “the way in which individuals 
finance their participation in the health care market.”26 However, the Act never prescribes 
that individuals have to use their insurance that the mandate requires them to pay for to 
cover their healthcare costs. Instead, there is no connection between the required 
insurance and the method by which individuals have to pay. The Congress furthers this 
fact by making it clear that they actually hope that these healthy individuals who now 
have to purchase healthcare insurance will not use the insurance, so that their premiums 
will instead subsidizes the costs of other participants. 
 The briefs then turn to challenging the idea that the minimum coverage provision 
is an integral part of the remainder of the Act’s permissible regulations of the Congress. 
They do not agree with the government that the mandate is not an end in itself. The 
necessary and proper clause only allows for the Congress to employ means by which 
otherwise constitutional objectives can be met; it does not give the Congress any large 
power to be “used for its own sake.”27 However, the power to create commerce rivals the 
power to raise and support the army and navy, which required their own explicit clauses. 
As such, it cannot simply be accepted as being an incidental byproduct of the power to 
regulate commerce. Of even more interest is the fact that the Congress, as well as the 
petitioner’s brief, accept that they need the individual mandate not to let the rest of the 
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26 HHS v. Florida, Brief for Petitioners, 18. 
27 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 416 (1812) 
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legislation be effective, but instead to counteract how effective the rest of the legislation 
would be without it because people would take advantage of the clauses.28 It is unlikely 
that the founders intended the commerce power’s combination with the necessary and 
proper clause to allow the Congress to create problems that require extraconstitutional 
solutions to fix. 
 The respondents do not limit their questioning of the use of the necessary and 
proper clause at this. They contend that even if the mandate is accepted as a means of 
executing their enumerated power under the commerce clause, it is still not “law … 
proper for the carrying into execution” of that power.29 It is not proper for carrying into 
execution such a power because it violates the letter and spirit of the constitution, in 
direct contraction to McCulloch.30 Several statutes regulating interstate commerce have 
been held unconstitutional by the Court because they were “inconsistent with the federal 
structure of our government,” as stated in New York v. United States.31 They argue that 
one of the most basic principles guarding the federal structure of our government is the 
concept of the federal government having only limited, enumerated powers. The power to 
compel individuals to enter into commerce is such a plenary power that it could allow the 
Congress to control nearly every decision that could be construed to have a substantial 
affect on interstate commerce.32 
 The notion that health and policing powers should and have always been left to 
the states rather than the federal government is also brought up. Even Gibbons recognized 
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that “health laws of every description” are among the plethora of legislation that should, 
and must, be exercised most advantageously by the states themselves. It points out that 
many states have passed legislation expressly preventing their residents from being 
burdened by the individual mandate. If the Court were to rule that the Congress’ 
commerce power, as amplified under the necessary and proper clause, overrules these 
laws, it would take the general policing power away from the states in favor of an even 
stronger federal police power.33 
IV. Reply Brief for Petitioners 
 
  The reply brief for the United States focuses on their two main arguments for the 
minimum coverage provision’s constitutionality from their initial brief. The provision 
regulates an economic activity that substantially affects interstate commerce, and it is 
necessary and proper to carry out the rest of the Act’s reforms. In response to the 
respondent’s brief that emphasized the fact that the Congress was attempting to create 
commerce out of thin air, the government argued that they were simply regulating an 
activity that already existed: uninsured people’s routine use of healthcare they cannot 
afford. They point out that as such, they are not creating new commerce to regulate, but 
are merely dictating “the timing and method of financing health-care services that 
members of the regulated class consume.”34 It is a pre-existing economic activity that has 
the substantial economic effect of risk-shifting and cost-shifting. They argue that no one 
can be inactive in their choice of how to insure against future healthcare costs. Choosing 
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self-insurance is as much of an action and choice as choosing private insurance.35 
Therefore, the arguments regarding the expansion of commerce is irrelevant because no 
other market has the same substantial economic effects resulting from a choice of 
perceived inactivity. 
They attack the argument regarding the timing of the requirement. The fact that 
the regulation is imposed well before consumption is mere difference in degree, not in the 
substance of the regulation. There is no constitutional or case law basis for deciding 
between these two choices of timing. Since the respondents would accept it at the point of 
consumption, it would also be constitutional at an earlier point because the Court should 
not dictate to the Congress the means by which it attains its constitutionally sound 
objectives. 
The respondents’ claims regarding the lack of authority under the necessary and 
proper clause is also countered. They argue that the necessary part of the clause is met 
solely by the fact that it is “‘convenient, or useful, or essential’ to the execution of an 
enumerated power,” citing McCulloch.  Since, in their minds, that standard is met, no 
further inquiry into whether or not the law is necessary it needed. They disregard the 
argument around the proper part of the clause by analyzing the two cases the respondents 
used as examples, New York v. United States (1992) and Printz v. United States (1997).36 
In both cases, it was the Congress’ attempt to command the states that was improper, but 
they left open the ability to command individual citizens.  Therefore, no precedent exists 
in their minds for overturning the congressional commerce legislation on the basis that it 
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was either not necessary or improper. Therefore, the minimum coverage provision is 
argued to be necessary and proper to carry out the rest of the act’s health insurance 
reforms. While the respondents characterize the act’s guaranteed-issue and community-
rating provisions as the cause of the need for the minimum coverage provision, the 
petitioners argue that it is simply necessary in order to make them effective.37  
  
                                                
37 ibid, 13. 
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Chapter 6: The Supreme Court’s Upcoming Decision 
 
 The Supreme Court’s decision on the constitutionality of the minimum coverage 
provision in HHS v. Florida will have immense consequences on the futures of the 
country, Obama administration, and healthcare market. While several of the Justice’s 
decisions have been predicted with high degrees of confidence, a few justices are not so 
easy to read. As a result, there is little consensus among legal experts as to which way the 
court is going to rule on the constitutionality of the individual mandate. Based on the 
effectiveness of the parties’ briefs, oral arguments will be the deciding factor in the 
Court’s decision. The written arguments, in conjunction with their constitutional 
philosophies, likely left several justices with questions that would have to be resolved in 
order for the particular justice to vote with that side. 
The “liberal justices” Ginsberg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan are widely 
thought to vote in favor of the mandate, but only two of the “conservative justices” are 
believed to be as locked-in on the other side of the argument. Justices Alito and Thomas 
are assumed to vote against the mandate, but the two remaining conservatives, Justice 
Scalia and Chief Justice Roberts, are faced with decisions that could lead them to vote 
against ideological lines. The swing vote, Justice Kennedy, is also difficult to envisage. If 
any of these three justices break ideological ranks and the join the four liberals, the 
individual mandate will be upheld and the commerce power will again be expanded. 
Roberts, Scalia, and Kennedy are each presented with unique circumstances that lead to 
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different degrees of uncertainty with which their decisions can be predicted months 
before the opinion of the Court is to be issued.  
I. Justice Antonin Scalia 
 
 Justice Scalia’s decision would have been a foregone conclusion, had it not been 
for Raich v. Gonzales (2005). With the regulation of congressional power he promoted in 
U.S. v. Lopez and U.S. v. Morrison, a similar check on the commerce power appears 
likely. However, in Raich, Scalia issued a concurring opinion that allowed the Congress 
to exercise its commerce powers over noneconomic activities, moving away from his 
limitation on the congressional commerce power. Thus, he could easily offer the four 
liberal justices the fifth vote that they need in order to form a majority. The importance of 
his vote can be seen in the parties’ briefs as they frequently cite his opinions and argue 
extensively on the issues that he based his decision on in Raich.  
In Raich, Scalia based his support of the Congress’ legislation on the necessary 
and proper clause of the Constitution. If the Congress needs to ban the simple possession 
of marijuana as part of a larger regulation of interstate commerce, it can do it so long as 
they are “appropriate means of achieving the legitimate end of eradicating marijuana 
from interstate commerce.”1 Scalia wrote that the Congress could regulate noneconomic, 
entirely intrastate activity so long as it is a necessary part of a broader scheme of 
regulation of interstate commerce. He does, however, consider the fact that as in Lopez, 
the Congress may not “pile inference upon inference in order to establish that 
noneconomic activity has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.”2 It is not difficult 
                                                
1 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, Scalia, J. concurring in judgment, 32-42 (2005). 
2 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), at 571. 
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to consider that the uninsured’s choice not to purchase health care has a substantial effect 
on interstate commerce, and as such Scalia might agree that the Congress has the ability 
to regulate it. Scalia would not have to decide whether or not the minimum coverage 
provision was a regulation of economic activity. The only issue Scalia would have to 
decide would be whether or not the provision was an appropriate way to effectuate the 
regulation of the national health insurance market. 
However, there are still important distinctions between Raich and HHS v. Florida 
that might let Scalia keep his intellectual integrity and dedication to federalism. In Raich, 
the Californians made the choice to enter into the realm of commerce by possessing 
marijuana. Even though the possession of marijuana in and of itself is not economic in 
nature, it was just one stop away from entering into interstate commerce by the choice of 
the person possessing it. There is no choice that American citizens make that subjects 
them to the individual mandate, just as there is nothing that they can choose to do or not 
to do in the hopes of remaining outside of the realm of interstate commerce and the reach 
of the mandate. Whereas marijuana is one step away from the interstate market because 
someone chose to possess marijuana, a person is one step away from the international 
healthcare market simply because of his or her American citizenship. Furthermore, Scalia 
can point to the fact that the individual mandate is not required for the Congress to 
effectively regulate insurance companies. The rest of the act provides for the regulation 
of the market that the Congress desires, but it merely has unintended consequences – in 
that it almost works too well. Scalia is unlikely to believe that unintended consequences 
give the Congress free license to correct them however it sees fit. 
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Perhaps most different of all is the fact that healthcare insurance mandate is an 
entirely new issue. As a strict originalist and federalist, Scalia cares about the 
Constitution’s limits on congressional power.3 Scalia was a member of the “federalist 
five” that constituted the majority on Lopez and Morrison. In that former instance, they 
issued the first court decision to stop the expansion of the commerce power by not 
allowing “attenuated links” to interstate commerce pass the substantial effects test.4 
Although they did not overturn precedent, they drew the line. Since the individual 
mandate would provide for the new regulation of inactivity – from which individuals 
cannot escape – Scalia might use this distinction to separate himself from Raich and vote 
to overturn the minimum coverage provision. In Printz v. United States, Scalia affirmed 
the notion that the fact that the Congress has historically not exercised an attractive power 
gives strong evidence that such a power does not, in fact, exist.5 Raich regulated an 
activity, and Scalia could take the position that choosing not to get private insurance is 
not an activity to preserve his intellectual honesty while maintaining his well-known view 
that the commerce clause needs limits.  
In 2011, Scalia joined Justice Thomas’ dissent of the Court’s decision to deny 
issuing a writ of certiorari in Alderman v. United States. This demonstrated his 
commitment to federalism and limits on the commerce power.6 In this case, the Ninth 
Court of Appeals ruled that the Congress had the power under the commerce clause to 
                                                
3 Ralph A. Rossum, Antonin Scalia’s Jurisprudence: Text and Tradition (Lawrence: 
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4 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), at 550. 
5 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
6 Elwood, John, “Supreme Court Relist Watch” The Volokh Conspiracy. 10 January 
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prevent felons from possessing or transporting body armor. The Court failed to grant 
certiorari, meaning that at least six justices decided not to hear the case, and allowed this 
ruling to stand. Thomas wrote that the Court “tacitly accept[ed] the nullification of our 
recent commerce clause jurisprudence” of Lopez and Morrison by allowing the appeals 
court to base its decision on a case from 1977, Scarborough v. United States.7 By joining 
Thomas on this dissent, Scalia signaled that his concurrence in Raich did not indicate a 
monumental swing in his perception of the interpretation of the commerce clause. The 
dissent argued that the appeals court’s logic threatened the “proper limits on Congress’ 
commerce power” and concluded that the Court should have granted certiorari, and thus 
hinted that Scalia’s vote on the individual mandate would be more along the lines of 
Lopez and Morrison than Raich.8 
Scalia is a brilliant justice and could likely find many other distinguishing features 
that render his concurrence in Raich insignificant in the healthcare litigation, and he is 
likely to do so in order to limit the commerce power. While Scalia has been hesitant to 
overturn precedent in the past, he would not pass up the opportunity to prevent another 
leap forward in the expansive nature of the interpretation of the commerce power. Scalia 
reinforced his dedication to the limited nature of the Congress’ enumerated commerce 
power by joining Thomas’ dissent in Alderman. Scalia will be more persuaded by the 
respondents’ arguments and vote to strike down the minimum coverage provision of the 
Act. 
 
 
                                                
7 Alderman v. United States, 562 U.S. (2011), Thomas, J. dissenting, 1. 
8 ibid, 3. 
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II. Justice Anthony Kennedy 
 
 As the Court’s infamous swing vote since the departure of Justice O’Connor, 
Kennedy is likely to fall on the winning side of this debate. However, his vote is far from 
certain. Justice Kennedy believes in two ideas, which would each result in a different 
decision for the determination of the constitutionality of the minimum coverage 
provision. First, he believes in the judicial – rather than political – duty to enforce limits 
on the federal government’s power. This belief would have him leaning towards 
overturning the minimum coverage provision. Second, he promotes the acceptance of the 
modern view of the expanded congressional regulation of the national economy.9 This 
belief has him leaning towards accepting the provision as a required part of the regulation 
of the new national economy that has arisen following industrialization and the New 
Deal. Thus, the question as to which side Kennedy is likely to push the Court’s decision 
has its answer in how effectively each side demonstrated the ability, or inability, of the 
mandate to represent judicially enforceable limits on future federal power.10 If the 
petitioners are unable to make their case for a practical and enforceable stopping point for 
federal power under the commerce clause, Kennedy’s recent trend for conservative 
rulings might very well break the tie in favor of overturning the mandate. 
 Kennedy voted against upholding the Gun Free School Zones Act in Lopez 
because he ruled that the law regulated “an activity beyond the realm of commerce in the 
                                                
9 Frank J. Colluci, Justice Kennedy’s Jurisprudence: the Full and Necessary Meaning of 
Liberty (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2009) 243. 
10 “Inside the Mind of Justice Kennedy on the Mandates’ Constitutionality.” 
BasmanRoseLaw. 30 March 2011. Accessed 28 March 2012. 
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ordinary and usual sense of the term.”11 In that regard, even though he refused to join the 
majority and only gave his own concurrence, there is an indication that this distinction 
between action and inaction could lead Kennedy to overturn the mandate. Kennedy 
stresses the “ordinary and usual” meaning of commerce in his concurrence, and it is 
hardly within the average American’s understanding that choosing not do anything is an 
action. Congress had held since Wickard that any action that substantially affects 
interstate commerce could be regulated, even if it is entirely intrastate and non-economic 
in nature. Even though the choice not to purchase healthcare is non-economic and local, 
Kennedy might construe Wickard as not covering it because it is outside of the realm of 
the ordinary and understood meaning of commerce, both today and at the time of the 
founding. 
The petitioners’ briefs do a good job at targeting Kennedy by emphasizing that 
the individual mandate is a part of the broader scheme of regulatory powers that the 
Congress has assumed since the New Deal. They cite the importance that the healthcare 
market plays in the individual and national level, and they also bring to bear the 
substantial effect that the uninsured have on the nation’s healthcare market. He has a 
practical “post-New Deal conception of the federal power to regulate a national 
economy,” and the briefs play to the importance the individual mandate has in the 
Congress’ regulation of this new national economy.12 By intricately connecting the 
individual mandate’s necessity in regulating interstate commerce to Wickard and 
                                                
11 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, Kennedy, J. concurring in judgment 568-584 
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12 Colluci, Justice Kennedy’s Jurisprudence: the Full and Necessary Meaning of Liberty, 
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demonstrating the large impact individuals’ decision have in aggregate to the workings of 
the national economy as a whole, the petitioners have strongly pushed Kennedy towards 
accepting the mandate as a forum of new regulation required after the New Deal. 
However, the petitioners’ attempt to convince Kennedy that allowing the 
individual mandate to stand would still allow for practical limitations on federal power 
was not as convincing. They first try to dispel this argument from the respondents by 
citing Scalia’s opinion in Harmelin v. Michigan (1992), claiming that the argument is 
weak because there is little “probability that the parade will in fact materialize.”13 Since 
the Congress is accountable to the people, they contend that the Congress would never 
pass laws requiring the people to purchase products like broccoli or cars – examples that 
have been brought up by the opposition in both the media and elsewhere as items that the 
Congress could legislate if the Court allowed the individual mandate. At first, they are 
unable to distinguish the medical insurance market from any other commercial market. 
Their response failed to adequately draw a line where “federal authority must be subject 
to some limitations.” The simple fact that the Congress might not use this authority 
would not placate Kennedy.14 
Sliding away from this argument, they try to sooth Kennedy’s fears with a 
“healthcare insurance is different” argument.15 They argue that because insurance is 
inherently different from regular market transactions. The receipt of an insurance card 
                                                
13 Department of Health and Human Services v. State of Florida, No. 11-398. Reply Brief 
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and insurance coverage is not the ends to which a payment for healthcare insurance is 
made, but rather the end good is the receipt of healthcare services. In most transactions, 
such as car purchases or broccoli, the good that is paid for and immediately received is 
the end desired. However, as respondents have pointed out, the Congress in no way has 
required people to use the insurance that they purchase, but instead they can finance their 
transaction however they see fit.16 Thus, the receipt of insurance is the end to which the 
Congress has declared the transaction must seek – not the use of the insurance for health 
services as the petitioners contend. Therefore, their conclusion that “upholding the 
minimum coverage provision thus would not authorize Congress to compel purchases of 
an end-product by a stranger to that end-product’s market” is false, because the end 
product in the case of the individual mandate is the insurance, and as such there is no 
distinction.17 
The government fails to provide any doctrine that would lead to a meaningful 
limit on the federal powers that would exist if the Court upheld the individual mandate. 
They first try to sidestep the argument by claiming that the Congress would never compel 
the people to buy anything, even though they do in fact have that power. However, 
Kennedy has expressed that political limits are not enough to curb exorbitant federal 
powers, but instead there must be judicial limits that can be readily enforced.18 Their 
attempt to characterize the healthcare insurance market as different failed as well. This 
removed another method by which the Court could have easily distinguished this ruling 
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from others in the future. Given the petitioners’ inability to persuade the Court of the 
existence of a rationale by which they could limit federal power, their success in unlikely. 
Kennedy will most likely vote against the minimum coverage provision, even though it 
was well portrayed as an extension of the New Deal type of federal government’s 
regulation of the single national economy, because the petitioners’ briefs failed to placate 
his commitment to judicially enforceable limits on the federal government.  
III. Chief Justice John Roberts 
 
Chief Justice Roberts’ vote is also difficult to predict. There are two main arenas 
from which Roberts is going to be heavily influenced. The first is his view of the 
Constitution, the commerce clause, and their relevance to the individual mandate – in 
essence, the same debate every Justice on the Court will undergo. The second arena, 
however, is one in which none of the other Justices could enter: being the Chief Justice. 
The fact that Roberts is the Chief Justice could play an incredibly important role in his 
decision making process. Beyond his own constitutional rationales, Chief Justice Roberts 
will also be affected by the importance he places on the Roberts’ Court’s legacy, the 
public’s perception of the Court, and the ability to decide who writes the opinion of the 
Court if he votes with the majority. 
With respect to Roberts’ constitutionally grounded basis – as opposed to the basis 
resulting from his position as Chief Justice – for determining which way to vote, he has 
given signals that could lend his vote to either side in this debate. In Roberts’ first judicial 
opinion in 2003, while on the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, he 
expressed a position limiting the Congress’ commerce power in Rancho Viejo v. Norton. 
In dissenting from the majority opinion, he argued for an en banc review because the 
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Congress did not have the power under the commerce clause to enforce the Endangered 
Species’ Act and prevent a construction company from building houses due to the 
presence of a species of frog. He argued that the emphasis has to be placed on “whether 
the activity being regulated” substantially affects interstate commerce, rather than 
“whether the challenged regulation” does so.19 He disagreed with the appellate court’s 
rationalization to sustain the application of the Act, which was that the construction was 
interstate commerce and the regulation governs that commerce, not whether or not 
removing the frog was interstate commerce. He thought that the court should have looked 
at the regulated activity, as looking beyond the regulated activity “would effectively 
obliterate the limiting purpose of the commerce clause.”20 
This distinction can be brought to bear on how he will rule on the individual 
mandate. He emphasized that the commerce clause was, in fact, a limited power and that 
the Court had the responsibility to keep it as such. Applying his rationale to the 
discussion at hand, one of the questions that the petitioners would need to answer to 
Roberts’ satisfaction is whether the activity being regulated by the individual mandate 
substantially affects interstate commerce. In the strictest terms, the activity being 
regulated by the mandate is the activity that it prevents. Since it prevents the practice of 
self-insurance, or not getting health insurance, Roberts would view the choice to not 
purchase health insurance as the activity being regulated. Following this, would the 
simple fact that someone does not purchase health insurance substantially affect interstate 
commerce? The answer is clearly that it does not and that an effect on interstate 
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commerce would only exist once an uninsured individual seeks healthcare services and 
fails to make the payment. Roberts has to be convinced that, without “looking primarily 
beyond,” the act of not purchasing health insurance, there is a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce. A whole series of actions – the uninsured getting ill, seeking 
medical treatment, getting this treatment, and failing to pay for these services – 
necessarily constitutes “looking primarily beyond.” As such, if he follows the arguments 
from his dissent in Rancho Viejo v. Norton, Roberts will vote against the individual 
mandate and rule it unconstitutional. 
Some scholars cite United States v. Comstock (2010) in predicting that Roberts 
will vote to uphold the individual mandate.21 In this case, Roberts joined Breyer’s 
opinion of the Court that promoted an expansive view of the necessary and proper clause. 
Rather than concurring in judgment and writing a separate opinion like the other two non-
liberal justices Kennedy and Alito, Roberts chose to be a member of the majority and 
subscribe to this view of the necessary and proper clause. Comstock ruled that the Court 
should show significant deference to the methods by which the Congress chooses to 
implement its enumerated powers. In this case, the majority voted to uphold an act of the 
Congress that authorized the civil commitment of sex offenders following their release 
from prison at the end of their sentence. In essence, the Comstock majority opinion said 
that so long as a law’s goal is to further an enumerated power and the Congress has a 
rational basis for believing it so, it is probably acceptable. 
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Affairs, ed. 8. Summer 2011, 58. 
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While Roberts’ support in Comstock should definitely give pause, it is hardly 
indicative of his vote in the upcoming case. There are several reasons why Roberts – and 
the court in general – will likely pass over the Comstock decision as an important 
precedent for his decision-making process in HHS v. Florida. Breyer bases the Court’s 
aforementioned broad interpretation of the necessary and proper clause on “five 
considerations, taken together.”22 Immediately, it is clear that this decision will not have 
far-reaching consequences as it will only serve as a precedent for other situations in 
which all five of these factors are also present. Therefore, to determine if Comstock will 
sway the Court, or indicate Roberts’ position, in the minimum coverage debate to favor 
the constitutionality of the individual mandate under the commerce clause, it must be 
determined that these same five considerations exist.  
The first factor is irrelevant, as it is a necessary condition for the second so it will 
be ignored.23 The second consideration is that the law was “an addition to a set of […] 
statutes that have existed for many decades.”24  While the government has clearly 
regulated the insurance market for decades, it is hard to substantiate the claim that the 
individual mandate can be considered an extension of that legislation. However, the 
scope Breyer defined in the opinion is fairly broad and as such the second consideration 
could help or hurt either side, but it at least provides for some doubt and debate.  The 
third consideration is that the regulation “reasonably extended long standing policy.”25 
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While some might be able to make strained arguments to support the existence of this 
consideration for the individual mandate, they could not be as conclusive as those that 
were used by Breyer to support the claim in Comstock.26 The fourth consideration taken 
into account by Breyer was that the statute “properly accounts for state interests.”27 In 
this instance, the states were allowed to remove federal interference if they could show 
that they were able to sustain a program that accomplished the same ends. Given that the 
only leeway given to the states in the Act is the ability to run the health insurance 
exchange in their own fashion, the individual mandate entirely fails to satisfy this 
requirement. Furthermore, as evidenced by the composition of the respondents, the states 
are at the lead charging against the Act because it does not leave them any choice.  
The fifth premise upon which Comstock is based is slightly strained as the 
individual mandate could be construed as “too sweeping in its scope.”28 In Comstock, the 
scope of the act was substantially limited. It only affected convicted sex offenders and 
only until such a time that their re-introduction into society was deemed safe. The 
minimum coverage provision is a sweeping new legislative item that affects everyone in 
the United States. In fact, it has no limitation whatsoever. Because the individual mandate 
provision fails to meet at least three of the five factors upon which Breyer and Roberts 
based their interpretation of the necessary and proper clause, its applicability to HHS v. 
Florida is weak, at best. Roberts’ decision is not leaning towards allowing the individual 
mandate based on this decision. In fact, it could be argued that as the most conservative 
member of the majority, these five considerations were required for Roberts to join in and 
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that without them, he would have wholly rejected this view of the necessary and proper 
clause. 
Now that Roberts’ credentials and vote – based solely on his perception of the 
constitutionality of the mandate – have been re-established as more conservative than 
liberal, the impact of his role as Chief Justice has to be analyzed. Roberts knows that the 
American public has an increasingly partisan view of the Court. Another 5-4 decision 
split along the same conservative-liberal ideological lines striking down Democratic 
President Obama’s keystone legislation would only reinforce this idea. The Chief Justice 
is aware of the legacy that he will leave behind, and even though this case is early in his 
career, it will have long-lasting implications.29 Roberts feels some pressure to promote a 
more decisive ruling than a 5-4 ideological split. Thus the question becomes whether or 
not Roberts would be willing make a decision contrary to the one he believes to be 
constitutional for the sake of the Court’s legacy. This is doubtful.30  
However, the fact that Roberts has the task of assigning who writes the Court’s 
opinion if he is on the majority might push him to vote to uphold the individual mandate 
if the four liberal justices had already gotten another justice to side with them. This would 
allow Roberts to assign the case to either himself or the conservative justice who flipped 
sides in order to limit the decision as a precedent for the future, if he felt so inclined. 
Furthermore, if the Court was split 5-3 when it was his turn to cast a vote, he might be 
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willing to set his judicial integrity aside and vote with the majority in order to dispel the 
notion of the politicized Supreme Court and give the American public a firm ruling on 
the matter. The likelihood of Roberts also joining the majority would increase if the fifth 
justice were Kennedy. Because Kennedy is well-known as the swing voter, a 5-4 decision 
upholding the mandate with the four liberal justices and Kennedy on the majority would 
represent another case of the Court being divided along ideological lines. It would not 
have been a “real” conservative justice that had joined the liberals, but rather the typical 
swing voter. However, if Roberts also joined the majority, it would be both a decisive 
ruling and one that clearly broke ideological lines. Given the landmark case that HHS v. 
Florida will become, it is doubtful that Roberts has not or will not take these factors into 
consideration. However, it is still more likely that Roberts will follow his conservative 
beliefs – Comstock notwithstanding – and strike down the individual mandate if the 
decision falls to him. 
IV. Oral Arguments 
 
 Thus, it was into this situation that both parties were set to argue orally before the 
Court to convince these three justices to rule in support of their position. Solicitor 
General Donald Verrilli, Former Solicitor General Paul Clement, and Michael Carvin 
argued the individual mandate portion of HHS v. Florida in front of the Supreme Court 
on March 27, 2012. While a certain level of uncertainty must be afforded to deductions 
drawn from justices’ questions during oral arguments, their questions as well as the 
lifelines that they threw to the litigators at various points in the arguments provide keen 
insight into how they are likely to vote in the coming months. The first ten minutes of 
oral arguments made it clear that the liberal justices are going to vote to uphold the 
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individual mandate. Scalia’s stance is also clear from the beginning, although Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy take a little longer to show their hand. However, by 
the end it is fairly clear that they both see significant problems with the mandate and that 
they will likely join Scalia in opposing the Act. In total, oral arguments reaffirm the 
aforementioned predictions for each of the justices, although to varying degrees.  
A. Liberal Justices 
Oral arguments essentially solidified the rock-solid base that the Act has from the 
four liberal justices, regardless of how poorly many commentators feel that Verrilli 
presented his case. Justice Ginsburg’s first interjection seemed designed to dig Verrilli 
out of a hole that he had dug in attempting to respond to Justice Alito. She commented, 
“if you’re going to have insurance, that’s how insurance works,” and Verrilli used this as 
the launching pad for the rest of his response to Alito.31 Ginsburg again had to throw 
Verrilli a lifeline when he got stuck answering Scalia’s question regarding the “principled 
basis for distinguishing” the individual mandate from other situations like broccoli.32 
Ginsburg essentially told Verrilli what his main point was, and Verrilli graciously 
accepted that what she said was “definitely the difference that distinguishes this market 
and justices this as a regulation.”33 
Justice Breyer also tilted his hand by piggybacking on the help that Ginsburg 
offered. He essentially answered one of Justice Kennedy’s questions for Verrilli. He also 
showed his own viewpoint in this instance when he said that, yes the Congress could 
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“create commerce that did not previously exist.”34 Sotomayor similarly had to step in to 
aid Verrilli in his defense from Scalia by summarizing the “three strands of arguments” in 
his briefs, and giving him a roadmap for his answer to Scalia’s questioning.35 Kagan 
aided Verrilli by essentially explaining why the Congress chose the individual mandate as 
opposed to several alternatives.36 In sum, the liberal justices of the Court left little doubt 
that they would vote to uphold the individual mandate. 
B. Targeted Justices 
Justice Scalia was the most vocal opponent of the individual mandate during 
Solicitor General Verrilli’s oral argument. Scalia’s comments indicate that he is 
vehemently skeptical of the individual mandate, and any limits that its constitutionality 
would put on the federal government. The comment that best illustrates Scalia’s view on 
the matter is, “If the government can do this, what else can it not do?”37 Scalia constantly 
barrages Verrilli with questions regarding the limitations to the Congress’ power, which 
he is not able to answer to Scalia’s satisfaction. He agrees with the respondents’ 
arguments that the Congress cannot impose the individual mandate to counter the 
effectiveness of the guaranteed-issue and pre-existing condition provisions of the Act as 
he declares, “it’s a self-created problem.”38 In sum, there is no doubt in most legal 
scholars’ minds at this point that Scalia is going to vote against the minimum coverage 
provision given his comments in oral arguments. 
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37 Ibid, 28. 
38 Ibid, 38. 
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Justice Kennedy mirrored Scalia’s skepticism when he asked Verrilli, “can you 
create commerce in order to regulate it,” while Verrilli was trying to answer Scalia’s first 
question.39 In this regard, Kennedy seems to have accepted the petitioners’ contention 
that the individual mandate was not merely regulating how people finance their 
healthcare. Instead, Kennedy at least appears to entertain the belief that the mandate 
creates commerce out of thin air, and as such he doubts the Congress’ ability to do this. 
Kennedy supplemented this doubt with what appears to be a glimpse into his own 
rationalization, that the Congress must have “a heavy burden of justification” in order to 
condone such an action that “is a step beyond what our cases have allowed.”40 Kennedy 
asked, “Can you identify for us some limits on the Commerce Clause,” and he did some 
seem thrilled with the response.41 Kennedy further makes it clear that he has qualms 
about the new fundamentally new relationship that this mandate creates between the 
individual and the federal government and mentions his concerns “requiring the 
individual to do an affirmative act.”42 Kennedy equally rejects the “healthcare is unique 
market” when he says “And in the next case, it’ll say the next market is unique.”43 Oral 
arguments indicate that Justice Kennedy does not seem to have accepted the petitioner’s 
explanation of limits on the commerce clause, and as such he is unlikely to support it. 
Chief Justice Roberts illustrated the doubts that he has with the mandate, and with 
the respondents’ inability to provide a valid limit to the Congress’ powers if they are 
allowed to impose the minimum coverage provision. Roberts joined in on the initial 
                                                
39 Ibid, 4. 
40 Ibid, 11. 
41 Ibid, 16. 
42 Ibid, 31. 
43 Ibid, 103. 
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assault led by Scalia and Kennedy but drawing comparisons between the healthcare 
market and “police, fire, ambulance, roadside assistance, whatever.”44 Roberts contends 
that the situations are nearly identical in that “you don’t know when you’re going to 
need” them and “the government will make sure you get it.”45 Roberts also argues “you 
cannot say that everybody is going to participate in” certain markets, and yet “you require 
people to purchase insurance coverage for that.”46 Roberts is not satisfied with Verrilli’s 
arguments and shows how he is likely to vote when he says that “but next year, they can 
decide everybody’s in this market; we’re going to look at a differently problem now, and 
this is how we’re going to regulate it.”47 
V. The Decision 
 
 The three justices that were most heavily targeted by the petitioners have varying 
levels of inclination for upholding the minimum coverage provision. But, it is still more 
likely that they will hold their ground and rule that the individual mandate is not 
authorized by the commerce clause in another 5-4 ideologically split ruling. Scalia is a 
staunch believer in limiting the commerce power and federal government in general, and 
his concurrence in Raich was a unique decision that is easily separable from the situation 
provided by the individual mandate. Kennedy, even as the swing voter, is unlikely to join 
a majority upholding the mandate because the petitioners have failed to show that an 
adequate check on the commerce power could still be maintained by the Court if it started 
down that road. Roberts believes that the commerce power is too large and needs limits, 
                                                
44 Ibid, 6. 
45 Ibid, 7. 
46 Ibid, 33. 
47 Ibid, 40. 
 80 
and neither his decision in Comstock nor his role as Chief Justice are likely to sway him 
from that position. Each of the justices mirrored these beliefs during oral arguments, and 
it does not appear that the government has persuaded them to the contrary. The 
conservative justices will likely hold strong and prevent another rampant bout of 
commercial power expansion. 
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